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The dramatic increase in outsourcing has led to a burgeoning theoretical literature 
that tries to explain the associated organization of production. So far, however, the 
literature has focused solely on analyzing the determinants of decisions by outsourcing 
firms, but has ignored the firms to which production is outsourced. This dissertation 
bridges this gap in the literature by studying outsourcing decisions not from the point of 
view of the outsourcing firm alone, but as a joint process that actively involves the 
manufacturer to which production is outsourced. 
In the theoretical part of the dissertation we focus on a particular form of 
international outsourcing, also known as the lohn system, in which the outsourcing firm 
provides the manufacturer with all the inputs needed to produce and then re-imports the 
final goods. We use an incomplete contracts framework to show that the lohn system is 
more likely to be adopted the lower the manufacturer’s ability to find low-cost inputs; the 
lower the bargaining power of  the manufacturer; and the lower the degree of 
relationship-specificity.   
In the empirical part of the dissertation we test the above predictions of the model. 
We exploit two unique firm-level databases from the National Institute of Statistics in 
Romania that provide information on physical production and balance sheet items for a 
large number of firms in Romania, collected monthly for the years 2005 and 2006. We 
use the data sources to construct two different datasets, one at the firm level and the other 
one at the firm-product level. We present firm-level results for cross-sections for the 
years 2005 and 2006, while at the firm-product-level we provide results for both cross-
section and panel data.  
Our empirical findings support the main predictions of the theoretical model. For 
instance, measuring the bargaining power of the manufacturer as the ratio of domestic to 
export sales, we obtain that the lower this ratio is, the more likely it is that the 
manufacturer will adopt the lohn system. Similarly, consistent with our theoretical model, 
we find that the lower the firm or product specificity, the higher the likelihood of 
adoption and the extent of usage of the lohn system. Using firm age as a measure of its 
ability to obtain the low-cost input provides mixed evidence for our theoretical 
prediction. Our results are robust to the use of different estimation procedures, measures, 
and samples.  
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CHAPTER 1  
 
Introduction and Motivation  
In the last two decades a large and growing part of production has become global 
either through foreign direct investment (FDI), or through international outsourcing. 
While initially a lot of attention was devoted to documenting and explaining the dramatic 
increase in FDI, in recent years, interest regarding international outsourcing has been 
growing both in academic circles and outside.1 Helpman [2006] argues that an 
understanding of what drives decisions involving outsourcing is essential for 
understanding the recent trends in the world economy.2 
A widely-used form of international outsourcing is the one in which the 
outsourcing firm provides the manufacturer with the inputs necessary for production. 
Under this arrangement the inputs are purchased by the outsourcing firm, imported into 
                                                 
1 Rising interest in outsourcing can be gauged from the fact that in 2004 there were 2,634 articles in US 
newspapers on service outsourcing alone (Amiti and Wei [2005]). This figure is especially interesting given 
the fact that service outsourcing constitutes a relatively small fraction of the total GDP for almost all 
countries around the world, as well as a relatively small fraction of outsourcing (Amiti and Wei [2005]). 
2 Recent years have seen a dramatic increase in international outsourcing. The most common type of 
outsourcing is material outsourcing, which has also increased steadily in the last decades, as evidenced by 
the growing trade in intermediate inputs. For instance, Feenstra and Hanson [1996] estimate that in US 
manufacturing there was an increase in total imported intermediate inputs from 5.3 percent to 11.6 percent 
between 1972 and 1990. Similarly, Hummels, Ishii and Yi [2001] and Yeats [2001] show evidence of 
increasing trade in components relative to trade in final goods. 
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the country where the manufacturer is located, processed there and transformed into 
goods that are exported to the outsourcing firm, which then sells them under its own 
brand name. This type of subcontracting arrangement has traditionally been used in the 
apparel, footwear, and textiles industries across the world (see Musiolek [2002]). Apart 
from these industries, this production arrangement can also be seen in Indian IT service 
outsourcing in recent years. In China alone almost 20% of its total exports were produced 
under this subcontracting arrangement in recent years,3 while a substantial portion of the 
production of garments in Central and Eastern Europe is carried out under this 
subcontracting arrangement, which is known in the region as the lohn system.4 In 
Romania, currently EU’s largest apparel producer, around 70% of the output in the 
apparel industry is produced under the lohn system.  
Despite the widespread use of this production arrangement in the real world, there 
does not exist any theoretical literature on why firms choose to adopt it instead of other 
arrangements. In particular, it has not been explained why firms choose to use the lohn 
system instead of a standard arm’s length transaction, in which the purchase of inputs is 
controlled by the manufacturer. Since both kinds of production arrangements are used in 
practice, but there is little knowledge as to how the choice between the two arrangements 
is made, in Chapter 2 we propose a theoretical model that identifies the necessary and 
sufficient conditions under which one versus the other production arrangement would be 
adopted. We build on the work by Feenstra and Hanson [2005] to develop a model of 
                                                 
3 According to Feenstra and Hanson [2003], processing exports in China alone accounted for a total of 
$128.55 billion per year on average between 1997 and 2002, which represents approximately 55% of 
China’s average total exports over the same period of time. Out of this, according to the same source, as 
much as 30% was produced under the subcontracting arrangement that we study. 
4 This is the regional name of this production arrangement (lohn means wage in German), which is 
commonly used in Central and Eastern Europe. Another name for this production system is ishleme 
(Turkish for embroidery) (see Musiolek [2002]). 
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relationship-specific investments and incomplete contracts that uses property rights 
theory in the vein of Grossman and Hart [1986] and Hart and Moore [1990].  
We find that the lohn system is more likely to be adopted when the manufacturer 
has relatively low ability to find low-cost inputs, whereas an arm’s length transaction is 
more likely when the manufacturer’s ability to find low-cost inputs is high. This is 
intuitive because allowing the more efficient agent to be responsible for the input 
supplies increases the size of the surplus to be divided between the two agents. We also 
find that the lohn system is more likely to be adopted instead of an arm’s length 
transaction when relationship specificity is low. This is in line with the Grossman-Hart-
Moore property rights literature in that when the holdup problem is less severe (i.e. 
specificity is low), ownership and control should be given to different parties. In our case 
the manufacturer owns the processing facility, whereas the outsourcing firm controls the 
input purchase (lohn system). Finally, we find that when the manufacturer has low 
bargaining power the lohn system is more likely to be preferred to an arm’s length 
transaction. 
In the empirical part of the dissertation we test the predictions of the theoretical 
model using data at the firm and firm-product level from two groups of manufacturing 
industries in Romania: apparel, textiles, and footwear on the one hand, and food, tobacco, 
and chemicals on the other hand. We show that our model applies to both groups, even 
though with some differences. We exploit two excellent data sources from the National 
Institute of Statistics in Romania: the monthly survey IND TS at the firm-product-level 
and firms’ annual balance sheets, which we were able to obtain and use for the first time 
in an econometric estimation. The IND TS survey allows us to identify, for each firm, 
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which products are produced under the lohn system each month, a feature that is crucial 
for our analysis and not available elsewhere. The balance sheets provide important 
additional characteristics for each firm. Using firm identifiers we were able to match the 
entries in the two databases and to construct two unique datasets, one at the firm level 
and the other one at the firm-product level. Details about the data sources and the 
construction of the datasets are provided in Chapter 3 of the dissertation. 
Chapters 3 and 4 both bring empirical evidence in support of the predictions of 
the theoretical model. Chapter 3 is devoted to the analysis of firm-level data and applies 
the theory in Chapter 2 under the assumption that all firms are single product firms. We 
show that, measuring the bargaining power of the manufacturer as the ratio of domestic 
to export sales, we obtain that the lower this ratio is, the more likely it is that the 
manufacturer will adopt the lohn system. Also, consistent with our theoretical model, we 
find that the lower the firm specificity, the higher the likelihood of adoption or the extent 
of usage of the lohn system. While our conclusions hold for both groups of industries that 
are analyzed, specificity shows up stronger in the apparel, textile, and footwear industry, 
while bargaining power has a stronger effect in the food, tobacco, and chemicals group. 
This suggests that the different technologies in different industries might matter. Finally, 
using a firm's age as a measure of its ability to obtain the low-cost input, we obtain mixed 
evidence that younger firms are more likely to adopt the lohn system. We believe that this 
result illustrates the fact that firm age also picks up other firm characteristics. 
In Chapter 4 we use the cross-section and panel data at the firm-product level to 
test the theoretical model under the assumption that multi-product firms make 
independent production decisions for each good they produce.  The cross-section results 
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are in excellent agreement with the results in Chapter 3. The analysis of the panel-data for 
the years 2005 and 2006 brings further evidence in support of the predictions that the use 
of the lohn system by a firm to produce a certain good is higher when the manufacturer’s 
bargaining power is low and when there are a lot of other firms that also produce that 
good (i.e. specificity is low).  
In order to test the validity of our results we perform several sensitivity and 
robustness exercises. We show that the results are robust to alternative specifications, 
alternative measures of key variables, to sample size, and to outliers.  
This dissertation contributes to the literature in various ways. First of all, this 
research belongs to the group of works that try to explain the decisions regarding 
outsourcing and the new forms of the organization of production. Within this branch of 
literature, our work belongs to the small, but growing trend of incorporating insights from 
the industrial organizational literature to explain how firms sort into different 
organizational forms. One of the main contributions of this dissertation is to analyze the 
decision about what organizational form to adopt, not from the point of view of the 
outsourcing firm alone, as in the existing literature, but as a joint process, in which the 
firm outsourcing goes to is also actively involved. Doing so enables us to answer the 
important question of why a particular organizational form of production is chosen by all 
parties.  
To our knowledge, this is also the first work that attempts to explain the adoption 
of the form of international outsourcing in which the outsourcing firm provides the 
manufacturer with the inputs necessary for production. This is an important research 
question given the widespread use of this production arrangement in various industries 
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traditionally and in light of the fact that we see it starting to be adopted in new industries 
such as the IT service industry in India. Given the lack of studies addressing this research 
question in the literature, this contribution is especially important and timely. In addition 
to constructing a theoretical framework to explain the choice between lohn and a standard 
arm’s length transaction, we are also able to find two excellent data sources and to use 
them for the first time for econometric estimation by compiling two unique datasets for 
our analysis. 
Apart from the above contributions, as with any new topic of research, this 
dissertation also raises a number of interesting and exciting questions to be pursued in 
future work, some of which we discuss at the end of each chapter. 
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CHAPTER 2  
 
Theoretical Model 
2.1 Introduction and Literature Review 
This chapter introduces the theoretical framework that we use to study the choice 
between the lohn system, the form of international outsourcing in which the outsourcing 
firm provides the manufacturer with the inputs necessary for production, and a standard 
arm’s length transaction, in which the manufacturer controls the purchase of these inputs.  
As mentioned in Chapter 1, this is one of the few works to date that study the 
outsourcing decisions not from the point of view of the outsourcing firm alone, but as a 
joint process, in which the firm to which production is outsourced is also actively 
involved. Our approach is different from that of the vast majority of the existing 
theoretical models of the “new organization of production,” which consider the decisions 
of firms in the outsourcing country, but ignore their counterparts in the countries where 
production is being outsourced. For example, Antras [2005], Antras and Helpman [2004], 
Grossman and Helpman [2004] make notable contributions in terms of explaining how 
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firms choose between international outsourcing and FDI and the effects of these choices 
on the economy of the country that engages in outsourcing and FDI, but they analyze 
these issues entirely from the point of view of the firms in the outsourcing countries. 
In order to explain outsourcing and the organizational forms associated with it, it 
is necessary to move away from traditional trade models and to include insights from the 
industrial organization literature, such as relationship-specific investments and 
incomplete contracts (Spencer [2005]). Progress has already been made towards 
understanding these new and increasingly important organizational forms. Earlier work 
on property-rights theory by Grossman and Hart [1986] and Hart and Moore [1990], as 
well as the incentive-system framework of Holmstrom and Milgrom [1994] have been 
incorporated into recent models of trade to explain determinants of firms’ sorting into 
organizational forms (see Spencer [2005] for a recent review of this literature). 
 The paper that is closest in spirit to the present research is Feenstra and Hanson’s 
work on “Ownership and Control in Outsourcing to China: Estimating the Property 
Rights Theory of the Firm.” Feenstra and Hanson [2005] use a framework of incomplete 
contracts to explain the form of export processing that is most common in China: FDI 
with manufacturer’s control over input purchases, i.e. the processing facility is owned by 
the outsourcing firm. We extend the Feenstra and Hanson [2005] model to account for 
the existence of the lohn system, in which the manufacturer owns the processing facility 
and the outsourcing firm provides the inputs necessary for production. To that end we 
allow for the possibility that there is a difference in the relative ability of the two agents 
to find the low-cost inputs. We also determine the necessary and sufficient conditions 
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under which the outsourcing firm and the manufacturer adopt the lohn system versus a 
standard arm’s length transaction.  
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows: Section 2.2 details the setup 
of the model, which is solved through backwards induction in Section 2.3. The results 
and the testable implications of the model are presented in Section 2.4. Section 2.5 
concludes. 
2.2 Setup 
We consider the case of a manufacturer engaged in export processing for an 
outsourcing firm located in a different country. Following recent trade literature, the 
framework we use to model the interaction between the manufacturer and the outsourcing 
firm is based on a model of international outsourcing developed in Feenstra and Hanson 
[2005]. This model uses the property-rights theory from Grossman and Hart [1986] and 
Hart and Moore [1990], in which contracts are assumed to be incomplete and parties use 
Nash bargaining to alleviate hold-up problems. Feenstra and Hanson use their model to 
explain the organizational form most common in export-processing in China: factory 
ownership and Chinese control over input purchases.  
We use the Feenstra and Hanson [2005] approach to develop a model that 
explains the opposite organizational form, which they do not look into: domestic 
ownership of the export-processing factory and foreign control over input purchases. As 
mentioned in Chapter 1, this production arrangement is widespread in many industries 
worldwide, for example textiles, apparel, and footwear. Most of the production of 
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garments from Central and Eastern Europe takes place under this production 
arrangement, known in the region as the lohn system.  
Let R be the manufacturer involved in export processing and let F be the 
outsourcing firm. The manufacturer uses imported5 inputs to produce the final good for 
the outsourcing firm, who then takes care of retail and distribution. The timing of the 
game is as follows: in period zero the two agents decide jointly who controls input 
purchase decisions, based on net payoffs in equilibrium. In period one they make 
preparations for production, in the form of effort investments aimed at increasing their 
combined profits. Effort investments are costly, relationship-specific, and they are 
observable, but not verifiable, which leads to a standard hold-up problem. After 
investments have been made the two parties bargain according to the generalized Nash 
bargaining solution. In the second and last period of the game inputs are bought, the good 
is produced and sold, and payoffs are realized. There is no re-negotiation at this stage. In 
the following we describe the setup of the model more formally. 
As already mentioned, in period one the two agents undertake investments to 
increase the value of total ex post gains. Following Feenstra and Hanson [2005], we 
assume that the following types of investments are made: to decrease the cost of inputs 
purchase, to prepare the factory for production, and to market the good. Efforts 
investments are denoted by 1e , 2e , and 3e , respectively. Hence 1e , 10 1e≤ ≤ , is the effort 
to look for a cheap input and is exerted by the agent who controls the input purchase 
decision. Recall that input purchases can be made by the manufacturer (standard arm’s 
                                                 
5 While in reality inputs used for production under the lohn system are imported, our model can also be 
applied to the case when inputs are domestically produced.  All our results, in terms of the conditions under 
which agents would adopt the lohn system versus a standard arm’s length transaction would remain 
unchanged in that case. 
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length transaction) or by the outsourcing firm (lohn system), depending on the form of 
production arrangement adopted. The effort level 2e , 20 1e≤ ≤ , is exerted by the 
manager of the processing facility R and represents effort to prepare the factory to 
produce. We can think of 2e  as being investment in productivity-enhancing technology. 
Finally 3e , 30 1e≤ ≤ , is the effort investment by the outsourcing firm F to market the 
final good, and could be thought of as the investment in a marketing campaign.  
Combined period profits at the end of period 2 are given by: 
 
 
( ) ( )2 3 2 1(1 ) 1 1
R
1
eSales venue Cost of Cost of input purchase
input
proc









The indicator variable δ  shows the production arrangement, and takes the value 0 if 
inputs are purchased by the outsourcing firm F (lohn system) and the value 1 if the 
manufacturer R controls the inputs purchase decisions (arm’s length transaction). 
Note that the revenue from the sale of R’s output is increasing in 3e , the effort by 
the outsourcing firm F to market the final good. Following the existing literature 
(Grossman and Helpman [2004], Feenstra and Hanson [2005]), we also assume that sales 
revenues are increasing in 2e . For instance, the manufacturer’s effort to prepare the 
factory for production by acquiring the latest technology available on the market could 
result in higher quality products, which can bring in higher revenues. Assuming linearity 
of the sales revenue function in the levels of effort, we can write it as: ( )2 31B e e+ +λ , 
 12
where 0B > is the level of revenues from sales that can be obtained in the absence of 
effort to increase firm productivity and to market the R’s output, and λ , where 0 1< ≤λ  
represents the marginal increase in sales revenue due to effort 2e  exerted by R to prepare 
factory for production, relative to the increase due to effort 3e  exerted by the outsourcing 
firm to market the final good.6 
Note that our results are not specific to the particular functional forms that we use 
for computational simplicity. In Appendix 1 at the end of this chapter we present an 
alternative specification of the model, in which effort levels 2e  and 3e  enter 
multiplicatively in the formula for sales revenues. This specification yields the same 
necessary and sufficient conditions under which the lohn system is used instead of a 
standard arm’s length transaction. Moreover, under this specification, sales revenues are 
equal to zero if either 2 0e =  or 3 0e = , which means that the manufacturer’s investment 
to prepare the factory for production, as well as the outsourcing firm’s effort to market 
the final good are indispensable. See Appendix 1 for a more formal treatment of this 
extension. 
The cost of input processing, on the other hand, is decreasing in 2e , the effort by 
R to prepare the factory for production. For computational simplicity, we assume that the 
cost of input processing is a linear, decreasing function of 2e  and it is given by: 
                                                 
6 In the paper I follow Feenstra and Hanson [2005] and Holmstrom and Milgrom [1994] and assume that λ  
lies between zero and one. This assumption implies that the marginal contribution of marketing effort to 
sales revenues exceeds the contribution of efforts to prepare factory for production. Note however that the 
results of my model also hold for values of λ  greater than one, as long as λ   is not too high, so as to result 
in positive net profit for any levels of effort. 
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( )21A e− , where 0A >  is the cost of processing the inputs in the absence of any effort to 
reduce this cost.  
The cost of input purchase is decreasing in 1e , the level of effort spent to look for 
a lower-cost producer. We assume that there is a continuum of input-suppliers of the 
perfectly homogeneous input that R needs to be able to produce, and that each of them is 
able to supply one unit of the input. These suppliers have different costs of producing the 
input. Let 0P >  be the price charged by the highest-cost input supplier. F or R, 
depending on who is responsible for purchasing the input, can choose to buy from the 
highest-cost supplier or search for lower-cost suppliers, who charge a lower price for the 
input. In view of the above, when F exerts the effort level 1e , it is able to buy the input at 
the price ( )11P e− . Hence, the higher the effort 1e , the lower the cost of input purchase.  
An important departure from the Feenstra and Hanson [2005] model is that we 
allow the two agents to differ in their ability to look for the cheaper input. Let 0a ≥  be 
the relative efficiency of the manufacturer R in finding the cheap input. It follows that, if 
the manufacturer controls the input purchase decision and exerts effort level 1e  to look 
for the cheap input, the price he expects to pay for the good is ( )11P ae− . Recall that the 
inputs needed for production are imported into the country where the manufacturer is 
located. Depending on where inputs are being imported from, as well as on individual 
firm characteristics of the manufacturer and the outsourcing firm, it can be that one firm 
or the other is more efficient in getting the low-cost input.  
  As mentioned before, exerting effort is costly to the agents; let FC  and RC  be the 
cost of expending effort to F and R, respectively. We assume that these cost functions are 
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increasing and convex. For simplicity, let them be quadratic in the levels of effort exerted 
by the two parties. We further assume that the effort costs incurred are proportional to 
agent F and R’s respective disutility of effort, Fγ  and Rγ , where 0, 0F Rγ > γ > . Using 
these notations and the afore-mentioned assumptions, we write the cost of exerting effort 
to the two parties as  
 ( ) 2 21 312
f
FC e e⎡ ⎤= − +⎣ ⎦
γ
δ  (2.2) 
and 
 2 21 2( )2
r
RC e e= +
γ δ . (2.3) 
2.3 Equilibrium Levels of Effort Investment 
 Recall that the timing of the game is as follows: in period zero the decision about 
who should control the purchase of inputs is made. In period one effort investments are 
made simultaneously by the two parties. In period two inputs are bought and processed, 
and the final goods are sold.  
Following the Grossman-Hart-Moore property-rights theory, we assume a 
framework of incomplete contracts. The manufacturer and the outsourcing firm cannot 
sign ex ante enforceable contracts, in which to specify binding levels of investment effort 
1e , 2e , and 3e . Hence, investments are observable, but not verifiable, and agents can only 
bargain over the surplus from the relationship after the effort investments have been 
made. We model the ex post bargaining as a generalized Nash bargaining game in which 
the outsourcing firm F obtains a fraction θ  of the ex post gains from the relationship, 
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where 0 1≤ ≤θ . Note that I allow θ  to take on the extreme values 0  and 1, when one 
agent makes a take-it-or-leave-it-offer to the other agent. 
As shown before, when the manufacturer R and the outsourcing firm F agree, the 
surplus that is obtained from the relationship is given by π  from equation (2.1). Let ˆFπ  
and ˆRπ  be the disagreement payoffs to F and R, respectively, i.e. agents’ payoffs when 
Nash bargaining breaks down. Let ψ  be the parameter that describes the degree of the 
hold-up problem or of relationship specificity. If the two parties fail to agree, then F can 
find another export processing plant to work with, but the return on his effort is reduced 
by a fraction ψ , where 0 1< <ψ . It follows that: 
 ( ) ( )3 1ˆ 1 1F Be Pe= − + −⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦π ψ δ . (2.4) 
Meanwhile, the manufacturer R can use the factory to process the input for 
another firm if the agreement with F falls through. In this case, R is entitled to the 
residual profits of the firm, but loses a fraction ψ  from the returns on his investment in 
joint-production. The underlying assumption here is that, if the manufacturer R has to 
work with a different outsourcing firm and R does not control the decision over input 
purchases, the price paid for the input is P . On the other hand, if the manufacturer R 
controls the purchase of the input, the price at which the input is bought is ( )11P ae− . 
Hence, R’s disagreement payoff is:  
 ( ) ( )2 2 1ˆ 1 (1 ) 1R Be A e P ae= − − − − −π ψ λ δ . (2.5) 
Using the above notations, we can write F and R’s ex post profits, which are 
denoted by Fπ  and Rπ , respectively. The ex post profits are given by the generalized 
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Nash bargaining solution, in which each party receives its disagreement payoff plus a 
fraction of the surplus from agreeing versus disagreeing, as follows:  
 ( ) ( ) ( )ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ1F F R F R F= + − − = − + −π π θ π π π θ π π θ π  (2.6) 
and 
 ( )( ) ( )( )ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ1 1R R R F F R= + − − − = − − +π π θ π π π θ π π θπ . (2.7) 
Since contracts are not ex ante enforceable, in period one the two parties choose 
investment efforts 1 2 3, ,e e e  non-cooperatively and seek to maximize their individual net 
payoffs. Maximizations need to be performed for the two possible scenarios, one in 
which the outsourcing firm F controls the decision about input purchases, and the other 
one, when the manufacturer R does, i.e. for 0=δ  and 1=δ , respectively.  
The outsourcing firm F maximizes F F FC= −π π , the difference between his ex 
post payoff and the cost of making effort investments. Using equations (2.2), (2.4), (2.5), 
(2.6), and (2.7) F’s maximization problem can be re-written as: 
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ){
1, 3
3 2 1 3 1max 1 1 1e e B e e Pe Be Peθ λψ θ ψ+ + + + − − + −⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦   
 ( )2 21 32
F e eγ ⎫+ ⎬
⎭
, for 0=δ  (2.8) 
and as 
  ( ) ( )( )
3
2
3 2 3 3max 1 1 1 2
F
e
B e e Be e⎧ ⎫+ + + − − −⎨ ⎬
⎩ ⎭
γ
θ λψ θ ψ , for 1=δ . (2.9) 
Similarly, the manufacturer R maximizes his net payoff R R RC= −π π , which we 
can re-write using equations (2.3), (2.4), (2.5), (2.6), and (2.8) as  
 ( ) ( ) ( ){
2
2 2 3 1max 1 (1 ) 1e B e A e P Be Pe− + − − − + + +⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦θ λ ψ  
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 ( ) 22 2 21 (1 ) 2
RBe A e P e ⎫+ − − − − −⎡ ⎤ ⎬⎣ ⎦ ⎭
γθ ψ λ , for 0=δ  (2.10) 
and as 
 ( ) ( ) ( ){
1 2
2 3 2 1,
max 1 (1 ) 1 1
e e
B e e A e P ae− + + − − − − +⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦θ λ ψ  
 ( ) ( ) 2 22 2 1 1 21 (1 ) 1 ( )2
RBe A e P ae e e ⎫− − − − − − +⎡ ⎤ ⎬⎣ ⎦ ⎭
γθ ψ λ ,  for  1=δ . (2.11) 
For 0=δ , i.e. when the outsourcing firm F makes input purchase decisions, take 
first order conditions in equations (2.8) and (2.10) and solve the resulting system of 
equations to obtain the following equilibrium levels of effort: 




P BB A Be e e
− + − ++ −
= = =




For 1=δ , i.e. when the manufacturer controls the input purchase decisions, solve 
the first order conditions for equations (2.9) and (2.11) for 1e , 2e , and 3e  to obtain the 











= = = . (2.13) 
2.4 Results 
In this section we show how the decision about the choice of production 
arrangement is made based on the net payoffs obtained in equilibrium. The equilibrium 
values of 1e , 2e , and 3e  as given by equation (2.13) are plugged into equation (2.11) to 
obtain the maximum net payoff available to the manufacturer R when it controls input 
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purchase decisions. Similarly, the values of 1e , 2e , and 3e  from (2.12) are plugged into 
equation (2.10) to obtain the maximum net payoff available to the manufacturer when the 
outsourcing firm F provides the input. Let 1 0| |R R R= =Δ = −δ δπ π  be the difference between 
the maximum net payoffs available to the manufacturer R when it controls the input 
purchase decision ( 1δ = ) versus when the outsourcing firm F buys the input ( 0δ = ). 











⎡ ⎤− + + − +⎣ ⎦Δ =
γ ψ ψθ ψθ ψ θ γ
γ γ
. (2.14) 
Note that, for different values of the parameters involved, RΔ  can take on both 
positive and negative values. In other words, depending on the degree of relationship 
specificity, on the ability to find the low cost input etc, the manufacturer R some times 
prefers to control the input purchase decision, while other times he prefers to let the 
outsourcing firm F supply the input necessary for production.  
 Similarly, we calculate the maximum net payoffs available to the outsourcing firm 
F under the two possible scenarios, by plugging the equilibrium values of 1e , 2e , and 3e  
as given by equation (2.13) into equation (2.11) and those from (2.12) into equation 
(2.10), respectively. Let 1 0| |F F F= =Δ = −δ δπ π  be the difference between the maximum 
net payoffs of the outsourcing firm F when the manufacturer controls the input purchase 
decision ( 1δ = ) versus when F himself buys the input ( 0δ = ), which can be expressed 
as: 
 
( ) 22 1 11
2F F





It is easy to see that 0FΔ ≤  for any parameter values allowed in the model, as 
specified in Section 2.2. Hence, the outsourcing firm F always prefers to control the input 
purchase decision, rather than let the manufacturer exercise that control. The explanation 
for this result has to do with the incentive mechanism in our problem. Since the 
manufacturer R owns the processing facility and is the sole residual claimant, the 
outsourcing F does not have the incentive to exert first-best levels of investment effort. 
However, by giving the outsourcing firm control over inputs, his incentives improve and 
he exerts effort at levels closer to the first-best. At the same time, note that the Nash-
bargaining solution guarantees that the manufacturer and the outsourcing firm will prefer 
working together to not dealing with each other at all, even when their rankings of the 
two production arrangements differ.  
The following decision rule is used to determine what arrangement to use: a given 
production system is adopted if it yields higher net payoffs to both agents in equilibrium. 
In the case where the two agents differ in terms of the choice of production system, in 
equilibrium the system in place would be the one preferred by the agent who gains the 
most. This could come about through a system of non-distorting transfer payments 
whereby the agent who gains more makes a transfer payment to the other agent so as to 
have his preferred system in place.7 In reality such a transfer might be used to alleviate 
concerns one party might have about the quality of inputs used for production. Suppose 
for instance that we are under the scenario in which the outsourcing firm prefers to 
control the purchase of inputs, but the manufacturer would rather he did, since that would 
                                                 
7 While in the paper we assume for simplicity that the outcome is decided through a transfer payment, in 
reality this could take place through various alternative mechanisms that we abstract from. For example, 
under an alternative scenario the two parties can bid for the low cost input supplier and the one with the 
higher valuation would win the bid. 
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yield him higher payoffs in equilibrium. However, the outsourcing firm is concerned that 
the manufacturer will not be able to buy the high quality inputs that he would like to be 
used in the production process. Then, if the gain to him from buying the better inputs at a 
higher price exceeds the loss to the manufacturer from not buying the cheapest inputs, the 
outsourcing firm may choose to make a transfer payment to the manufacturer for his 
agreement to have the outsourcing firm control the input purchase decision.  
In light of the notations introduced, the decision rule for the adoption of the lohn 
system can be formulated as follows: if 0RΔ < , then the lohn system is adopted, since it 
is optimal for both agents. If 0RΔ > , then cases need to be considered:  
1) if 0R FΔ + Δ > , then the manufacturer R makes a transfer payment to the 
outsourcing firm F and the non-lohn-system is adopted, i.e. the agents engage in 
an arm’s length transaction;  
2) if 0R FΔ + Δ < , then the outsourcing firm F makes a transfer payment to the 
manufacturer R to compensate him for not having his preferred system in place 
and the lohn-system is adopted.  
3) If 0R FΔ + Δ = , the two agents are indifferent between the two production 
arrangements. 
 Given that FΔ   is always negative, the decision rule simplifies and becomes: lohn-
system is adopted if and only if 0R FΔ + Δ >  and non-lohn system is adopted if and only 
if 0R FΔ + Δ < . We re-write the expression for R FΔ + Δ  with FΔ  and RΔ  replaced by 
their expressions from equations (2.14) and (2.15) and, after some manipulations and 
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setting 1P = , we obtain the following necessary and sufficient condition for the adoption 















 denotes the relative disutility of effort for the outsourcing firm F relative 
to the manufacturer R. Note that the conditions under which the lohn-system will be 
adopted are captured in one formula that has very intuitive interpretation. 
Four propositions follow immediately from expression (2.16). See Appendix 2 for 
a graphical illustration of the following results:  
Proposition 1: The lohn-system will be adopted for values of the relative 












η > , a standard arm’s length transaction is used.  
Proposition 2: The lohn-system will be adopted for values of the relative 












 , a 
standard arm’s length transaction is used.  
 Proposition 3: For values of the fraction of the ex post gains obtained by the 
manufacturer (i.e. the lower the bargaining power of the manufacturer R) 
211 a− η− θ <
ψ
, the lohn-system is adopted. For 
211 a− η− θ >
ψ
 a standard arm’s 
length transaction is used.  
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To summarize, we show that the lohn system is more likely to be adopted: the 
lower the relative disutility of effort (η) for the outsourcing firm F relative to the 
manufacturer R; the lower the manufacturer’s efficiency in finding low-cost inputs ( a ); 
the lower the fraction of the ex post gains obtained by the manufacturer (i.e. the lower R’s 
bargaining power); and the lower the degree of relationship-specificity (ψ ). 
When providing an interpretation for the above-stated results, it is useful to group 
Propositions 1 and 2 together, and Propositions 3 and 4 together. Propositions 1 and 2 
are intuitive because allowing the agent who has a lower disutility of effort or who is 
more efficient in finding the low-cost input be responsible for the purchase of input 
supplies increases the size of the surplus to be divided between the two agents. 
Propositions 3 and 4, on the other hand, summarize results pertaining to the bargaining 
between the two agents. In these cases, shared ownership and control of the factory and 
inputs (i.e. the lohn system) comes about because it provides the non-residual claimant 
(the outsourcing firm F) with better incentives to exert effort. In particular, the result that 
the lohn system is more likely to be adopted instead of an arm’s length transaction when 
relationship specificity is low is in line with the Grossman-Hart-Moore property rights 
literature. According to results in this literature, when the holdup problem is less severe 
(i.e. specificity is low), the ownership and control should be given to different parties. In 
our case the manufacturer owns the processing facility, whereas the outsourcing firm 
controls the input purchase (lohn system). 
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2.5 Conclusions 
In this chapter we develop the first model that explains why firms engaged in 
export processing choose to adopt the subcontracting arrangement known as the lohn 
system, in which the outsourcing firm provides the manufacturer with the inputs needed 
to produce. It is surprising that despite a vast and growing literature on international 
outsourcing, this important aspect of the choice of production arrangement has not been 
looked into. Our model builds on the Feenstra and Hanson [2005] model of international 
outsourcing in an incomplete-contracts setting, which we extend to be able to explain a 
form of production arrangement that they do not investigate.  
We are able to provide necessary and sufficient conditions under which the lohn 
system is adopted instead of a standard arm’s length transaction and vice-versa. 
Specifically, we show that it is optimal to adopt the lohn system when the ability of the 
manufacturer to find the low cost input provider ( a ) is low, when the relative disutility of 
effort for the outsourcing firm (η) is low, when the manufacturer’s bargaining power 
(1− θ ) is low, and when the degree of relationship-specificity (ψ ) is low. The opposite is 
true for the cases when an arm’s length transaction would be preferred. We show that 
these results are robust to alternative parameter specifications, including the extreme 
cases when one agent has the ability to make a take-it-or-leave-it offer to the other agent 
at the stage when surplus is divided. 
The model we use in this chapter explains why some firms choose to adopt the 
lohn system while others do not. This leads to a natural extension exploring the impact of 
this production arrangement on firm performance over time. Does the lohn system make 
the firms that adopt it more (less) productive? Does it cause these firms to grow faster 
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(slower) than the others firms? These are interesting questions particularly in view of 
their policy implications about the lohn system’s being a short-run versus long-run 
strategy. These issues are already debated in the manufacturing sector in Romania. Some 
argue that firms who adopt the lohn system come to rely on the outsourcing firms for 
their inputs and hence do not invest in their own input production technology or make 
investments to reduce input procurement costs. Use of the lohn system is not likely to be 
an optimal long-run strategy for the local firm under these circumstances. The analysis of 
this issue, given its essentially dynamic nature constitutes a possible extension of the 
theoretical model presented here. 
Another possible extension of the present theoretical model is to take into account 
the market structure in both the market for the goods whose production is being 
outsourced, as well as that in the market for inputs. In the textile and apparel industries 
for instance, where the lohn system is widely used, both the input and the product 
markets have a market structure that can be characterized as monopolistically 
competitive. Hence, it would be very interesting to see how our results change once we 
account for the market structure.  
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Appendices to Chapter 2 
Appendix 1 
 
 Below we present an alternative specification of the model, in which the 
manufacturer’s effort to prepare the factory for production ( 2e ) and the outsourcing 




( ) ( )2 3 2 1 2 31 1 1 , if e e 0
0                                                              otherwise
Be e A e P e aδ δ
π
⎧ − − − − − + ≠⎡ ⎤⎪ ⎣ ⎦= ⎨
⎪⎩  (2.17) 
 
 The rest of the terms are kept exactly as introduced in Section 2.2. We solve the 
model in the same way as described in Section 2.3 and obtain the following equilibrium 
levels of effort investment. 
 For 1δ = , i.e. when the manufacturer controls the input purchase decisions:  
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⎡ ⎤θ + θ − + ψ − θ + γ + θλ − ψ⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦⎣ ⎦= =
γ γ γ − θ − θ
θ + θ λ − ψ + γ − θ − ψ⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦=




 For 0δ = , i.e. when the inputs necessary for production are provided by the 
outsourcing firm (the lohn system): 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( )





















− θ −ψ + γ + θλ − ψ⎡ ⎤− ψ + ψθ ⎣ ⎦= =
γ γ γ − θ − θ
θ + θ λ −ψ + γ − θ − ψ⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦=
γ γ − θ − θ
 (2.19) 
 
 Note that the expressions for 2e  and 3e  are different under the new specification 
than under the initial one, where they were given by equations (2.12) and (2.13). 
However, when we solve for FΔ  and RΔ , we obtain the same expressions as the ones 
given by equations (2.14) and (2.15) and consequently, the same conditions under which 
the lohn system is preferred to a standard arm’s length transaction and vice-versa. 
 As noted before, this specification has the advantage that it makes investment 
efforts 2e  and 3e , the effort to prepare the factory for production and to market the final 
good, respectively, indispensable for obtaining gains from trade. In addition, this 
specification supports the claim that the results we obtain are not driven by the particular 




Figure 2.1 below illustrates the results stated in Proposition 1 and Proposition 2. The 
boundary between the lohn and the arm’s length transaction regions is given by the 






Figure 2.1: Lohn vs Arm’s length transaction region as a function of a  andη , computed 





Figure 2.2 illustrates the results stated in Proposition 3 and Proposition 4. Again, 
the boundary between the lohn and the arm’s length transaction regions is given by the 






Figure 2.2: Lohn vs Non-Lohn region as a function of θ andψ , computed for 0.9a =  





Figure 2.3 summarizes the results of Propositions 1 through 4, and shows the lohn 
and non-lohn regions as functions of , ,a θ ψ , for 1η = . Note that the arm’s length region 
lies above the surface that has the equation ( )22 2 1 1 0aη + ψ θ − − = , while the lohn-region 






Figure 2.3: Lohn vs. arm’s length regions as a function of , ,a θ ψ , for 1η =  
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CHAPTER 3  
 
Evidence Using Firm-Level Data 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter offers the first pieces of empirical evidence in support of the predictions 
of the theoretical model presented in Chapter 2. There we found that a manufacturer is 
more likely to adopt the production arrangement called lohn (the form of international 
outsourcing in which the outsourcing firm provides the manufacturer with inputs 
necessary for production) over a standard arm’s length transaction when his ability to 
find low cost inputs is low, his bargaining power is low, or when transaction specificity is 
low.  
In the present chapter we use cross-section data at the firm level to show that, 
measuring the bargaining power of the manufacturer measured as the ratio of domestic 
sales to export sales, the manufacturer is more likely to adopt the lohn system when this 
ratio is low than when it is high. Also, consistent with our theoretical model, we find that 
the lower the index of firm specificity, the higher the likelihood of adoption or the extent 
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of usage of the lohn system.  We find mixed evidence that, using a firm's number of years 
in existence as a measure of its ability to get a low-cost input, younger firms are more 
likely to adopt the lohn system. 
The empirical analysis in this chapter uses a firm-level dataset that we construct using 
two unique data sources from the National Institute of Statistics in Romania. These two 
data sources are also exploited to put together a second dataset, at the firm-product level, 
which we use for the empirical analysis presented in Chapter 4. Section 3.2 describes the 
data that were available to us, as well as how both datasets were constructed. We then use 
the implications from our theory and the data available to construct the empirical 
variables and arrive at our empirical specification; this step is detailed in Section 3.3.  
Section 3.4 presents the results of the empirical analysis using cross-section data at 
the firm level for the years 2005 and 2006. We show that our results are robust to the use 
of different estimation procedures (the linear probability model, logit, Tobit) and samples 
(for different industries, different years, etc). Section 3.5 concludes. 
 
3.2 Data 
The data used in this dissertation come from two separate databases at the 
National Institute of Statistics in Romania: the Short-Term Indicators Survey (the IND TS 
survey) and firms’ annual balance sheets.  
In order to measure usage of the lohn system we use firm-level data for the years 
2005 and 2006 from the IND TS survey conducted by the National Institute of Statistics 
in Romania. This unique data source allows us to identify, for each firm in the sample, 
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the quantity of each item produced under the lohn system each month. This information 
is essential for our analysis and is not available in other data sources from Romania or 
other countries. To our best knowledge, this is the first time this data source is used for 
econometric estimation in general, and in particular, to estimate the determinants of the 
lohn system in Romania.  
The following monthly data from the IND TS survey8 are also available at the 
firm-product level and are used to construct measures for the determinants of the lohn 
system (our right-hand side variables): inventory at the beginning and at the end of each 
month, quantity produced in the current month, quantity sold domestically and abroad in 
the current month, and value of total quantity sold, which is reported in Romanian 
currency (Leu--code RON9). Section 3.3.2 contains a description of how the data was 
used to construct the variables for the empirical model.  
The IND TS survey covers all industries in Romania; however, the data we use is 
for the following six manufacturing sectors: apparel, textiles, leather goods and footwear, 
food and beverages, tobacco, and chemicals, chemical products, and man-made fibers.10 
The first three industries on the list are the ones in which the lohn production system has 
been heavily used. The other three industries are used for comparison and include two 
light industries: food and beverages and tobacco, and one heavy industry: chemicals, 
                                                 
8 Additional background information and the sample design for this survey are provided in Appendix 1.  
9 In July 2005 Romania introduced its new redenominated currency, the new leu (code: RON), which was 
valued at 10,000 old leu (code: ROL). 
10 Industries are classified according to the NACE (French: Nomenclature Générale des Activités 
Économiques dans les Communautés Européennes), the European Union industry standard classification. 
The first four digits of NACE codes are the same for all countries in the EU. For a complete list of NACE 




chemical products, and man-made fibers. Table 3.1 shows that the six industries that are 
the focus of our analysis account for a significant percentage of output in manufacturing.  
In addition to data from the IND TS survey we have information from firm annual 
balance sheets, which provide important additional characteristics of each firm. These 
data were released by the National Institute of Statistics in Romania, which collects the 
information from the Department of Public Finance to whom firms in Romania have the 
obligation to report annually. We have the following information from the database with 
annual balance sheets:  firm location (at the county level), form of ownership (whether 
state-owned or private, Romanian or foreign etc, as described in Table 3.2), year of 
establishment, total revenue (in RON), number of employees, and NACE industry codes 
at the 2 and 4-digit levels. We use these data to construct measures for the determinants 
of the lohn system (as described in Section 3.3.2), and also for our vector of controls (for 
details see Section 3.3.3).  
Using firm identifiers we matched the records from the two databases and created 
an annual firm-level dataset that we use to test the predictions of our theoretical model. 
Details about how the dataset was constructed are provided in Appendix 2. In each year, 
only firms with Romanian ownership that engaged in export activities in the current year 
were kept for the purpose of our analysis. In terms of the classification by type of 
ownership outlined in Table 3.2, we kept only firms with ownership codes 10 and 21 
(Romanian, at least 50% state owned), 26 and 31 (Romanian, at least 50% privately 
owned), and 40 (Romanian cooperative ownership). Also, we eliminated outliers from 
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our sample,11 i.e. firms with fewer than five employees and those with an annual 
TotalRevenue of over 2 billion RON. Finally, we kept in the sample only the observations 
for which all the variables were non-missing. Thus, 889 firm-level observations were left 
in the sample for the year 2005 out of the initial 2,132 for firms with Romanian 
ownership. Of these, 743 observations are for firms in the textiles, apparel, and footwear 
industries, while the remaining 146 are for firms in the food processing, tobacco, and 
chemical products industries. Our firm-level sample for the year 2006 contains 888 
observations out of the initial 1,805 for firms with Romanian ownership: 771 of these 
firms are in the textile-apparel-footwear group, while 117 are firms in the food-tobacco-
chemicals group.  
3.3 Using the Theory to Develop an Empirical Strategy 
3.3.1 Implications of Theory for Empirical Analysis 
In the theoretical part of this dissertation we developed a model that analyzes the 
conditions under which the form of international outsourcing known as the lohn system 
(in which the outsourcing firm provides the manufacturer with the inputs necessary for 
production) is preferred to a standard arm’s length transaction. Simply put, the decision 
under investigation is over who should control the purchase of inputs. If the outsourcing 
firm (denoted by F) controls the input purchase decision, the production arrangement is 
                                                 
11 Note that the results we obtain are robust to the inclusion of outliers, as shown in Table 3.10 and Table 
3.11. 
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called lohn. If the manufacturer (R) controls the inputs used for production, then the 
arrangement is a standard arm’s length transaction.  
The decision rule is the following: a given production system is adopted if it 
yields higher net payoffs to both agents in equilibrium or if the agent who gains more 
pays the other agent to have its preferred system in place. For the outsourcing firm F the 
difference between the maximum net payoffs available under the two alternative 
productive arrangements is denoted by FΔ  and is given by:  
 
( )2 1 11
2F F
P −ψ − θ⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦Δ = −
γ
, (3.1) 
where 0P >  represents the maximum price at which the input is available for purchase 
on the market; ψ  ( 0 1≤ ψ ≤ ) is the parameter for relationship-specificity (i.e. the fraction 
from the return on investment that the agents lose if the deal falls through and they have 
to find other agents to work with); θ  ( 0 1≤ θ ≤ ) represents the fraction of ex post gains 
from the relationship obtained by F; and Fγ  ( 0Fγ > ) represents the disutility of effort for 
agent F.12 Note that 0FΔ ≤  for any parameter values in the specified ranges, hence, the 
outsourcing firm always prefers to control the input purchase decision over allowing the 
manufacturer to have control over it.  
 For the manufacturer R the difference between the maximum net payoffs 
available under a standard arm’s length transaction vs. lohn is denoted by RΔ  and it is 
given by: 
 











                                                 
12 See Section 2.4 for the explanation of how equation (3.1), as well as (3.2) and (3.3) are derived.  
 36
where a  ( 0a ≥ ) represents the relative ability of the manufacturer R to find the low-cost 
input; Rγ  ( 0Rγ > ) represents the disutility of effort for agent R; and , , , FP ψ θ γ  have the 
same meaning as before. Note that, for parameters within the specified range, the sign of 
RΔ  is ambiguous.  
 As shown in Section 2.4, the rule simplifies to the following: the lohn-system is 
adopted if and only if 0R FΔ + Δ >  and a standard arm’s length transaction is adopted if 
and only if 0R FΔ + Δ < . In the case 0R FΔ + Δ = , the two agents are indifferent between 
the two production arrangements. After further manipulations we obtain the following 













 denotes the relative disutility of effort for F vs. R. This expression of the 
conditions under which the lohn-system is adopted has a relatively straight-forward 
interpretation, which will make the transition to empirical estimation relatively smooth.  
The following implications of the theoretical model can be drawn immediately from 
expression (3.3): 
1. The lower the relative disutility of effort (η) of the foreign buyer F vs. the 
domestic producer R, the more likely it is that lohn will be adopted.  
2. The lower the manufacturer’s ability to find the low-cost input ( a ), the more 
likely it is that the lohn-system will be adopted.  
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3. The lower the fraction of ex post gains obtained by the manufacturer (i.e. the 
lower R’s bargaining power 1− θ ), the more likely it is that the lohn-system will 
be adopted. 
4. The lower the relationship-specificity (ψ ), the more likely it is that the lohn-
system will be adopted. 
Given the constraints of the data that were available, only implications 2, 3, and 4 
are testable empirically and these will be the focus of our analysis from now on. We 
assume for simplicity that 1η = , i.e. the two agents have the same disutility of effort. The 
necessary and sufficient condition for the adoption of the lohn system can be re-written 
as:  
 ( )22 2 1 1a + ψ − θ < , (3.4) 
where , ,a θ η  have the meaning explained previously. 
3.3.2 Constructing the Empirical Variables Corresponding to the Theoretical 
Model 
In order to test the predictions of the theoretical model the following variables 
need to be identified: the dependent variable that indicates whether a given firm uses the 
lohn system in a given year and to what extent; the bargaining power of the domestic 
manufacturer (1-θ , where 0 1≤ θ ≤ ); the relative ability of the domestic manufacturer to 
find the low-cost input ( a , where 0a ≥ ); and the parameter for relationship-specificity 
(ψ , where 0 1≤ ψ ≤ , i.e., the fraction of return on investment that the agents lose if the 
deal falls through and they have to find other agents to work with). 
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The dependent variable is defined in two different ways: binary and continuous. 
As a binary variable, the left-hand side term captures the decision of the manufacturer to 
adopt the lohn system versus not adopting it. Upon estimation, this measure provides us 
with the probability that a firm would adopt the lohn system in a given year. 
Alternatively, the dependent variable is defined in a continuous fashion as the fraction of 
sales under the lohn system, exploiting the variation across firms of the share of sales 
under the lohn system. The specific measures constructed for the firm-level dataset are 
presented in Appendix 3.  
Our measure of the bargaining power of the manufacturer is based on the 
interpretation of bargaining power as patience, according to the non-cooperative 
foundations of the Nash bargaining framework. Everything else being the same, the more 
patient player, who can bear the cost of delays in reaching an agreement, has a higher 
bargaining power. Hence, from here on we call the parameter ( )1− θ  patience and we 
devise measures to capture patience.  
For instance, the manufacturer would be more patient in negotiations with an 
outsourcing firm if he produced mostly for the domestic market and would not depend 
much on sales abroad. This situation would be reflected in a high ratio of domestic sales 
to export sales for the respective company. We use this ratio as a proxy for the 
manufacturer’s patience and implicitly, for the firm’s bargaining power.  
Another situation in which the manufacturer would be more patient in 
negotiations with an outsourcing firm would occur if he had a lot of inventory relative to 
output produced in the previous period. In this case he would want to sell the inventory to 
generate income before he produces more, so he would be more patient in negotiations 
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about future production. Hence, a higher ratio of inventory to output will make the 
manufacturer more patient in negotiations with the outsourcing firm. We use this ratio as 
an alternative measure for the manufacturer’s bargaining power. Appendix 3 presents in 
detail how we construct both the domestic sales to export sales ratio and the inventory to 
output ratio at the firm level in. The Davidson-MacKinnon J-test for non-nested 
alternatives that we conducted to determine which of the two variables was more 
appropriate for our analysis failed to reject either of the two measures. For reasons of 
exposition, in the text we will present the results obtained by using the domestics sales to 
export sales ratio as a measure for bargaining power, while the baseline results using the 
inventory to output ratio are presented in Table 3.13-Table 3.14. 
To measure a , the relative ability of the domestic manufacturer to find a low-
cost input supplier, we use the number of years in operation (FirmAge). Everything else 
being the same, the higher the number of years a firm has been in operation, the greater 
its reputation and the existing network, and the higher the ability to find a low-cost input 
supplier. See Appendix 3 for a detailed description of the measures for a . 
Finally, the parameter for relationship specificity (ψ ) is defined in terms of the 
specificity of the assets and skills involved in production. This in turn is reflected in the 
number of firms producing that good.13 Consider for instance what it takes to 
manufacture men’s shirts versus sophisticated embroidered women’s tops that require 
                                                 
13 In his paper on “Credible Commitments: Using Hostages to Support Exchange” (American Economic 
Review, September 1983, 73,5 19-40.),Williamson identifies four distinct sources of specificity (p.526): 1. 
human capital specificity; 2. physical asset specificity; 3 site specificity; and 4. dedicated assets specificity. 
The relevance of each of these sources to our discussion can be inferred from the characteristics of the 
manufacturing industries that are the focus of our analysis. Site specificity is not important because goods 
produced by most manufacturing industries can be relocated at relatively low costs. This is especially the 
case in the industries that we analyze. Our measure allows for other sources of hold-up, be it physical 
assets, human capital investments, or dedicated assets. As explained in the text, we argue that all of these 
are inversely related to the number of firms that use those assets or those workers.  
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special embroidering machines or workers specially trained to embroider manually. Since 
it is much more complicated to manufacture the latter versus the former, there will be 
many more firms producing men’s shirts than women’s embroidered blouses. Hence, 
specificity is related to the size of the production market for any given product 
manufactured by a firm. The more firms produce a certain product, using the same 
technology, the more likely it is that the assets and the skills involved are not very 
specific. The measure for specificity is described in detail in Appendix 3. 
3.3.3 Estimation Equation 
The qualitative predictions of the theoretical model we want to test are that the 
lohn system is more likely to be used when the ability of the manufacturer to find low 
cost inputs ( a ) is low, when his bargaining power (1− θ ) is low, and when relationship 
specificity (ψ ) is low. One way to test these predictions using cross-section data is to use 
a linear model of the form:  
 ( )0 1 2 3 41j j j j j jy a X= β +β +β ψ +β − θ +β + ε , (3.5) 
in which j  is the subscript for an individual firm; , ,a θ η  have the same interpretation as 
above; and jX  represents a vector of controls that we discuss in detail later on in this 
section. The dependent variable is defined in two different ways: as a binary variable, jy  
takes the value one if firm j  uses the lohn system, and zero otherwise. Alternatively, jy  
is defined as a continuous variable that represents firm j ’s fraction of sales under the 
lohn system. We use these two measures to capture lohn system usage in the absence of 
contract-level data.  
 41
 Before continuing our discussion of estimation based on the linear model 
proposed by equation (3.5), we consider whether this model captures the correct 
relationship between the dependent and the observed explanatory variables. Indeed, the 
analytical condition for the adoption of the lohn system given by expression (3.4) seems 
to suggest that there might be room for exploiting the functional forms in that expression 
to arrive at an empirical specification. In particular, expression (3.4) seems to indicate 
that jty  might depend on , 1a − θ  and/or ψ  in a quadratic fashion, or that the model 
might contain an interaction term between the manufacturer’s bargaining power 1− θ  and 
relationship specificity ψ . We have experimented with various model specifications that 
include these features and have conducted tests for functional form misspecification 
using the J-test proposed by Davidson and MacKinnon [1981] for non-nested alternative 
models with the same dependent variable. In general we are not able to conclusively 
reject the linear model. In particular, when we test the linear model given by equation 
(3.5) against the following model that uses the functional form in equation (3.4): 
 ( )22 20 1 2 1j j j j jy a u= γ + γ + γ ψ − θ + , (3.6) 
 
we are able to reject the latter, but not the former14. Hence, in the following we will use 
the linear model captured by equation (3.5) as the main empirical specification and our 
empirical results will be derived by estimating this equation using different techniques.  
Note that in the estimation equation given by (3.5) we control for ownership and 
location-specific factors that might affect the usage of the lohn-system at the firm level. 
                                                 
14 See Table 3.9 in the Appendix to Chapter 3 for details.  
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We do that by putting ownership and county fixed effects into the regression equation, 
which becomes 
 ( )0 1 2 3 41j j j j j j j jy a X= β + α + δ +β +β ψ +β − θ +β + ε . (3.7) 
Here jα  and jδ  are ownership and county fixed effects. Vector jx  includes other 
controls for firm size, such as the number of employees (NumberEmployees) and the 
revenue (TotalRevenue).  
The parameters of interest in equation (3.7) are: 1β , the coefficient on the 
manufacturer’s ability to find low cost inputs ( ja ); 2β , the coefficient on relationship 
specificity ( jψ ), and 3β , the coefficient on the manufacturer’s bargaining power (1 j− θ ). 
Based on the theory, the expected signs for these coefficients are: 1 2 30; 0; 0β < β < β < .  
 We use various techniques to estimate Equation (3.7). When the left-hand side 
variable is binary, we employ both a linear probability model and the binary response 
model logit. Alternatively, when the dependent variable is the percentage of output 
produced under lohn, i.e. a continuous variable censured at 0 and 1, we use the linear 
probability and Tobit models to test our predictions.  The results of our estimation are 
presented in Section 3.4.  
3.4 Results  
3.4.1 Summary Statistics 
Table 3.3 presents summary statistics for our main variables at the firm level, for 
cross-section data in years 2005 and 2006. The statistics are consistent across the two 
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years. On average, over 89% of the surveyed firms from the textiles, apparel, and 
footwear industries used the lohn system in 2005; the same is true for the year 2006. In 
the other manufacturing group, which includes the food-processing, tobacco, and 
chemical industries, lohn is also used, albeit less, with around 37% of the firms adopting 
it in each of the two years.  As we would expect based on the theory, firms in the textiles, 
apparel and footwear industries have, on average, domestic sales to export sales ratios 
and firm specificity a few times lower than firms in the food, tobacco, and chemicals 
group, in each of the two years.  
It is also worth pointing out that both in the industries where lohn is widely used, 
and in the ones in which it is used less, there are firms that produce their entire output in 
lohn (i.e. PercentageLohnFirm = 1), but also some that do not use lohn at all (i.e. 
PercentageLohnFirm = 0). Indeed, it is fairly common, particularly for smaller firms with 
few products, to either produce all their output using the lohn system or opt out of it 
altogether.  
Finally, the two groups of industries differ, on average, in terms of total revenue 
and number of employees. On average, firms in the food processing, tobacco, and 
chemical industries have about four times the total revenue and double the number of 
employees that firms in the textiles, apparel, and footwear group do. This reflects the 
difference in technologies between the two groups of industries and the fact that the latter 
is much more capital intensive than the former. In the following sections we discuss how 
these differences can explain the results we obtain when the theoretical model is applied 
to one group of industries versus the other. 
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3.4.2 Baseline Results 
Table 3.4 presents baseline results for the estimation of equation (3.7) using cross-
section data at the firm level for the year 2005. The sample includes only the observations 
for the textiles, apparel, and footwear industries. The manufacturer’s ability to find low 
cost inputs is measured by the number of years a firm has operated (FirmAge). The 
manufacturer’s bargaining power is measured by the weighted average of the firm’s 
domestic sales to export sales, using the shares of the different products in the firm’s total 
output as weights (HomeSalesToExportSalesRatio2). FirmSpecificity measures the 
coefficient of relationship specificity. The construction of all the measures is explained in 
Appendix 3. Each specification includes the controls for firm size mentioned in Section 
3.3.3, as well as ownership and county dummies. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard 
errors are given in brackets. 
Columns 1 and 2, where the dependent variable LohnFirm is binary, look at the 
impact of the explanatory variables on the probability that the firm adopts the lohn 
system. Column 1 of Table 3.4 shows the results of ordinary least squares estimation. As 
expected, all the coefficients of interest are negative and the coefficient on 
FirmSpecificity is statistically significant at the 5% level. In column 2 of the table we 
present the results of estimating the same specification using logit instead of OLS. When 
estimating the logit model Stata dropped the observations for which only one value of a 
predictor variable was associated with only one value of the response variable (a situation 
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known as perfect prediction)15. In this way the sample was reduced from 743 to 639 
observations. For the sake of consistency and in order to be able to compare the 
magnitude of estimates across specifications, we used the reduced sample in all the other 
estimations16. The logit estimates reported are marginal effects, not regression 
coefficients. All the estimates keep the correct sign, but the coefficient on FirmSpecificity 
is now significant only at the 10% level. Note also that the scaled estimates for logit 
(obtained by dividing the logit estimates by 4) are larger in magnitude than the OLS 
estimates for all the variables of interest. For instance, the scaled estimate of FirmAge is -
0.01, which is higher than the OLS coefficient of -0.003. Similarly, for the coefficient on 
FirmSpecificity, the scaled logit estimate is -0.502, which is higher than the OLS estimate 
of -0.279.  
We use predicted probabilities to interpret the results of logit estimation. Table 3.8(b) 
shows that the predicted probability of a firm’s adopting the lohn system is 0.684, if the 
parameter for firm specificity is equal to one, whereas if that parameter is very low, the 
probability goes up to 0.941 (while the other regressors are held constant at their mean 
value). The firm’s domestic sales to export sales ratio seems to have a weaker effect on 
the probability that a firm in the apparel, textiles, or footwear industry will adopt the lohn 
system, For very high values of the domestic sales to export sales ratio, which in our 
interpretation corresponds to high bargaining power of the domestic manufacturer, the 
predicted probability of adopting the lohn system is 0.888 and it increases to 0.934 when 
                                                 
15 For instance, if all the firms in textiles, apparel, and footwear, located in the same county used the lohn 
system in 2005, or if none of them did, Stata dropped the corresponding observations from the sample 
before running the logit model.  
16 Note, however, that the results we obtain are robust to the inclusion of the observations dropped by logit. 
Table 3.12 presents the results for OLS and Tobit for the sample that includes all 743 observations, for the 
year 2005.   
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this ratio is very low, i.e. when the bargaining power of the domestic manufacturer is low 
(see Table 3.8(c)). Finally, firm age seems to have little impact on the probability that a 
firm in the apparel, textiles, or footwear industry will adopt the lohn system: the 
probability of adoption is 0.954 for new starters, and 0.922 for firms that have been 
operating for 14 years.  
Columns 3 and 4 of Table 3.4 present the results of estimating the effect of the 
explanatory variables on the extent to which the lohn system is used, i.e. on the share of 
exports under the lohn system (continuous dependent variable PercentageLohnFirm). 
The rest of the specification is identical to the one in the first two columns. The 
estimation techniques used in this case are ordinary least squares and Tobit, which is 
appropriate given the continuous nature of our dependent variable, bounded between 0 
and 1. The Tobit estimates reported are marginal effects, not regression coefficients. As 
predicted by the theoretical model, all the estimates of interest have negative sign, 
meaning that the extent to which lohn is used is higher when the manufacturer’s ability to 
find low cost inputs ( ja ) is low, when his bargaining power (1− θ ) is low, and when 
relationship specificity ( jψ ) is low. The coefficient on FirmSpecificity is now statistically 
significant at the 1% level. Note also that, just as logit estimation implied greater impact 
of the independent variables on the left-hand side variable than OLS estimation did, 
marginal effects after Tobit in column 4 are higher than OLS estimates in column 3 for 
all the variables of interest.  
The four models used for estimation in Table 3.4 are also used to analyze the 
sample for the food, tobacco, and chemicals industry for the year 2005 and the results are 
reported in Table 3.5. The first aspect to note is that the coefficients on the firm domestic 
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sales to export sales ratio and on firm specificity have the expected negative sign. This 
indicates that the predictions of the theoretical model hold for this group of industries as 
well, albeit with some differences. For the food, tobacco, and chemicals industry, the 
measure for bargaining power is highly statistically significant across specifications, 
while the measure for specificity is significant at the 10% level or better only in 2 out of 
the 4 models. This result is different from what we found for the textile, apparel, and 
footwear industries, where the measure for firm specificity was highly statistically 
significant, while the measure for bargaining power was not.   
In interpreting the above results it is useful to recall the implications of the 
theoretical model. Specificity matters directly for determining the disagreement-payoff. 
Our results seem to indicate that the disagreement payoff affects the apparel, textiles, and 
footwear industry more than the food, tobacco, and chemicals group. Bargaining power, 
on the other hand, matters directly in determining the division of the surplus, which 
seems to affect the food, tobacco, and chemicals industry, but not so much apparel, 
textiles, and footwear.   
Finally, the coefficient on firm age is positive, though insignificant, across 
specifications in Table 3.5, indicating that older firms in these industries are more likely 
to adopt the lohn system. We believe that this result reflects the fact that FirmAge 
captures many other firm characteristics in addition to the manufacturer’s ability to find 
low cost inputs that we want to measure. 
In view of the above we conclude that our baseline results offer support for our 
intuition and the predictions of our theoretical model. Our results indicate that low 
specificity and bargaining power make firms in all industries analyzed more likely to use 
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the lohn system, However, specificity shows up stronger in the apparel, textile, and 
footwear industry, while bargaining power has a stronger effect in the food, tobacco, and 
chemicals group.  Our results also indicate that younger firms are more likely to adopt the 
lohn system in the apparel, textiles, and footwear industry, but not in the food, tobacco, 
and chemicals industry. We believe that this result illustrates the fact that the age of the 
firm captures many other characteristics apart from its ability to find low-cost inputs. 
3.4.3 Robustness Checks 
We test the robustness of our results by conducting the empirical analysis on data 
from 2006. Table 3.6 and Table 3.7 report the findings of the estimations using cross-
section data at the firm level for the year 200617. We find a remarkable similarity with the 
results obtained for the year 2005, which provides additional validation for the theory, as 
well as for the empirical approach used to test it. Table 3.6 is the equivalent of Table 3.4 
for the year 2006, using the corresponding sample for the textile, apparel, and footwear 
industries. Just like in Table 3.4, all coefficients of interest have the expected sign across 
all specifications. Moreover, the coefficients on FirmSpecificity are statistically 
significant at the 1% level, while the coefficients on the ratio of domestic sales to export 
sales are not statistically significant. Unlike in Table 3.4, the coefficient on firm age is 
statistically significant at the 5% level or better in 3 of the 4 specifications. 
  Table 3.7 is the equivalent of Table 3.5 and the results are very similar to the 
ones obtained for the year 2005: the coefficient on firm age is positive, but not 
                                                 
17 We do not show the results of panel data analysis using the firm-level dataset because firm fixed effects 
use up too many degrees of freedom. However, the analysis using panel data at the firm-product level for 
the years 2005 and 2006 supports our predictions based on the theoretical model. See Chapter 4 for details.  
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statistically significant, across specifications. The coefficient on domestic sales to export 
sales ratio is negative and statistically significant at the 5% level or better in three of the 
four specifications. Finally, the coefficient on FirmSpecificity is negative and statistically 
significant at the 10% level in two of the four specifications. Note that, just like in the 
analysis for the year 2005, specificity, and through it, the disagreement payoffs, seem to 
matter more in the apparel, textiles, and footwear industries, while the division of surplus 
has a stronger impact in the food, tobacco, and chemical industries. 
3.5 Conclusions 
In this chapter we present the empirical strategy and the data used to test the 
theoretical model developed in Chapter 2 and perform analysis using cross-section data at 
the firm-level. We start by describing the unique data that we were able to obtain from 
the National Institute of Statistics in Romania. These data include firm-level information 
on physical production and balance sheet items for a large number of firms in Romania, 
collected monthly over several years. We explain how we use these data to construct two 
datasets (one at the firm-level and one at the firm-product level) for the empirical 
analysis, as well as the empirical variables corresponding to the theoretical model.  For 
example, firm age is used to measure a manufacturer’s ability to find low cost inputs; the 
ratio of domestic to export sales measures the manufacturer’s bargaining power; and the 
index for relationship specificity is inversely related to the number of firms that produce a 
certain good.  
 The remainder of the chapter is dedicated to testing the main predictions of the 
theoretical model on cross-section data at the firm-level for the years 2005 and 2006. 
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Analysis using the product-level dataset, for both cross-section and panel data is 
presented in the next chapter. In general, the results support the predictions of the 
theoretical model for both groups of industries analyzed. For instance, the probability of 
adopting the lohn system is inversely related to the manufacturer’s bargaining power and 
to specificity. However, the results suggest that the different technologies in the two 
groups of industries may matter: relationship specificity and the division of surplus seem 
to have a stronger effect in the apparel, textiles, and footwear industries, while bargaining 
power affects more the food, tobacco, and chemicals group. Firm age offers partial 
support to our prediction that firms with a lower ability to find low-cost inputs are more 
likely to use lohn. We obtain that younger firms are more likely to adopt the lohn-system 
in the apparel, textiles, and footwear industries, but that older firms are more likely to do 
so in the food, tobacco, and chemicals industry. We believe that this result shows that 
firm age picks up other firm characteristics in addition to the ability to find low cost 
inputs, which makes the overall effect ambiguous. Our results are robust to the use of 





Table 3.1: Percentage of Total Manufacturing Output Corresponding to Industries 
in the Sample 
Industry Year 2004 Year 2005 Year 2006 
Food and beverages 17.24% 17.22% 15.96% 
Tobacco products 1.87% 1.72% 1.61% 
Textile products 2.86% 2.58% 1.95% 
Clothing products 5.02% 4.03% 3.72% 
Leather goods and footwear 2.23% 1.88% 1.84% 
Chemical substances and products 7.41% 5.87% 5.65% 
Total 36.63% 33.30% 30.72% 
 
Note: Percentages were calculated based on annual production figures in value terms.  




Table 3.2: Classification of Romanian Firms by Type of Ownership, with 
Corresponding Codes 
Description Code 
Full State Ownership 10 
Mixed ownership, more than 50% state-owned 
State+Romanian Private 21 
State+Foreign 22 
State+Romanian Private+Foreign 23 
Mixed ownership, less than 50% state-owned   
State+Romanian Private 26 
State+Foreign 27 
State+Romanian Private+Foreign 28 
Private Ownership (Romanian or Romanian+Foreign) 
Romanian 31 
Romanian+Foreign 32 
Cooperative Ownership 40 
Full Foreign Ownership 60 
 






Table 3.3: Summary Statistics at the Firm-Level: Years 2005 and 2006 
Variable  Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Year 2005 
Textiles&Apparel&Footwear           
LohnFirm 743 0.89 0.31 0.00 1.00
PercentageLohnFirm 743 0.61 0.35 0.00 1.00
FirmAge  743 9.60 4.22 0.00 14.00
FirmHSESRatio1 743 3.83 17.64 0.00 296.13
FirmHSESRatio2 743 2.38 9.34 0.00 119.99
FirmSpecificity 743 0.06 0.14 0.00 1.00
TotalRevenue  743 4.52 9.58 0.01 150.30
NumberEmployees 743 184.44 275.64 5.00 2097.00
Food&Tobacco&Chemicals           
LohnFirm 146 0.38 0.49 0.00 1.00
PercentageLohnFirm 146 0.33 0.46 0.00 1.00
FirmAge  146 11.37 3.94 0.00 14.00
FirmHSESRatio1 146 14.23 44.39 0.00 360.21
FirmHSESRatio2 146 14.37 37.80 0.00 246.92
FirmSpecificity 146 0.17 0.25 0.00 1.00
TotalRevenue  146 45.86 132.04 0.07 1442.07
NumberEmployees 146 309.75 553.47 5.00 5275.00
Year 2006 
Textiles&Apparel&Footwear           
LohnFirm 771 0.90 0.29 0.00 1.00
PercentageLohnFirm 771 0.84 0.33 0.00 1.00
FirmAge  771 9.07 5.32 0.00 15.00
FirmHSESRatio1 771 4.44 29.69 0.00 521.21
FirmHSESRatio2 771 1.79 8.66 0.00 169.23
FirmSpecificity 771 0.05 0.12 0.00 1.00
TotalRevenue  771 4.65 8.87 0.01 106.67
NumberEmployees 771 178.98 241.51 5.00 1919.00
Food&Tobacco&Chemicals           
LohnFirm 117 0.37 0.48 0.00 1.00
PercentageLohnFirm 117 0.33 0.47 0.00 1.00
FirmAge  117 12.09 3.99 0.00 15.00
FirmHSESRatio1 117 10.87 28.67 0.00 175.24
FirmHSESRatio2 117 18.30 77.52 0.00 710.80
FirmSpecificity 117 0.17 0.23 0.00 1.00
TotalRevenue  117 65.32 177.41 0.11 1731.81







Table 3.4: Baseline Results at the Firm Level: Textiles&Apparel&Footwear, 2005 
  2005: Textiles&Apparel&Footwear 
  Dep. Var.: LohnFirm Dep. Var.: PercentageLohnFirm
 1 2 3 4 
  (OLS) (LOGIT) (OLS) (TOBIT) 
FirmAge -0.003 -0.041 -0.005 -0.019 
 [0.003] [0.042] [0.003] [0.012] 
FirmHSESRatio2 -0.001 -0.005 -0.001 -0.004 
 [0.001] [0.013] [0.002] [0.004] 
FirmSpecificity -0.279** -2.007* -0.539*** -0.991*** 
 [0.138] [0.833] [0.136] [0.271] 
TotalRevenue -0.021*** -0.220*** -0.020*** -0.074*** 
 [0.004] [0.056] [0.004] [0.011] 
NumberEmployees 0.001*** 0.007*** 0.001*** 0.002*** 
 [0.000] [0.002] [0.000] [0.000] 
Constant 0.783*** -1.416 0.582** 1.109 
 [0.250] [3.551] [0.227] [0.703] 
Observations 639 639 639 639 
R-squared 0.25   0.33   
 
 
Table 3.5: Baseline Results at the Firm Level: Food&Tobacco&Chemicals, 2005  
  2005: Food&Tobacco&Chemicals 
  Dep. Var.: LohnFirm Dep. Var.:PercentageLohnFirm 
 1 2 3 4 
  (OLS) (LOGIT) (OLS) (TOBIT) 
FirmAge 0.016 0.109 0.017 0.104* 
 [0.014] [0.088] [0.014] [0.056] 
FirmHSESRatio2 -0.003*** -0.294*** -0.003** -0.220*** 
 [0.001] [0.114] [0.001] [0.083] 
FirmSpecificity -0.264 -2.848* -0.333** -2.611 
 [0.185] [1.498] [0.132] [1.578] 
TotalRevenue -0.001 -0.011* 0 -0.008 
 [0.001] [0.006] [0.001] [0.005] 
NumberEmployees 0 0.002** 0 0.001 
 [0.000] [0.001] [0.000] [0.001] 
Constant 0.011 -4.154* 0.077 -3.317* 
 [0.361] [2.232] [0.344] [1.888] 
Observations 89 89 89 89 
R-squared 0.36   0.33   
Robust standard errors in brackets    
All specifications include ownership and county dummies  
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%  
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Table 3.6: Robustness to Sample Selection: Textiles&Apparel&Footwear, 2006 
  2006: Textiles&Apparel&Footwear 
  Dep. Var.: LohnFirm Dep. Var.:PercentageLohnFirm 
 1 2 3 4 
  (OLS) (LOGIT) (OLS) (TOBIT) 
FirmAge -0.008** -0.103*** -0.007*** -0.018 
 [0.003] [0.037] [0.003] [0.011] 
FirmHSESRatio2 -0.003 -0.022 -0.004 -0.011** 
 [0.003] [0.022] [0.003] [0.005] 
FirmSpecificity -0.526*** -3.456*** -0.744*** -2.027*** 
 [0.156] [0.920] [0.170] [0.370] 
TotalRevenue -0.011*** -0.120* -0.015*** -0.055*** 
 [0.004] [0.063] [0.005] [0.009] 
NumberEmployees 0.000*** 0.005** 0.000*** 0.002*** 
 [0.000] [0.002] [0.000] [0.000] 
Constant 0.736*** -2.041 0.795*** 1.133** 
 [0.280] [1.316] [0.286] [0.540] 
Observations 649 649 649 649 
R-squared 0.21   0.31   
 
Table 3.7: Robustness to Sample Selection: Food&Tobacco&Chemicals, 2006 
  2006: Food&Tobacco&Chemicals 
  Dep. Var.: LohnFirm 
Dep. Var.: 
PercentageLohnFirm 
 1 2 3  4 
  (OLS) (LOGIT) (OLS) (TOBIT) 
FirmAge 0.018 0.103 0.016 0.106 
 [0.015] [0.099] [0.015] [0.120] 
FirmHSESRatio2 -0.001*** -0.179** -0.001*** -0.26 
 [0.000] [0.081] [0.000] [0.171] 
FirmSpecificity -0.643* -4.192 -0.709* -6.051 
 [0.327] [3.576] [0.355] [4.593] 
TotalRevenue -0.001*** -0.023 -0.001 -0.028 
 [0.000] [0.016] [0.000] [0.024] 
NumberEmployees -0.000*** 0.000 -0.000** 0.000 
 [0.000] [0.002] [0.000] [0.002] 
Constant 0.163 -0.217 0.123 0.911 
 [0.411] [3.931] [0.440] [5.785] 
Observations 64 64 64 64 
R-squared 0.48   0.43   
Robust standard errors in brackets     
All specifications include ownership and county dummies   
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%  
 
 55
Table 3.8(a-c): Predicted Probabilities Year 2005 
 
Table 3.8(a)      Table 3.8(b) 







































































Table 3.9: J test for non-nested models 
H0: M1  t(2675)   -1.242
H1 : M2  p-val 0.215
H0 : M2  t(2676)   7.871
H1 : M1  p-val 0.000
 
Note: M1 is the linear model given by equation (3.5), while M2 is the model with quadratic terms 
from equation (3.6) 
 
 
Table 3.10: Robustness to Inclusion of Outliers: Year 2005 
 
 2005: Textiles&Apparel&Footwear 
 Dep. Var: LohnFirm 
Dep. Var: 
PercentageLohnFirm 
 1 2 3 4 
 (OLS) (LOGIT) (OLS) (TOBIT) 
FirmAge 0.000 -0.005 -0.001 -0.005 
 [0.002] [0.030] [0.003] [0.012] 
FirmHSESRatio2 0.000 -0.005 -0.001 -0.005 
 [0.001] [0.013] [0.002] [0.005] 
FirmSpecificity -0.295** -2.061** -0.552*** -1.130*** 
 [0.137] [0.797] [0.135] [0.307] 
TotalRevenue -0.017*** -0.213*** -0.019*** -0.081*** 
 [0.004] [0.053] [0.004] [0.012] 
NumberEmployees 0.000*** 0.006*** 0.000*** 0.002*** 
 [0.000] [0.002] [0.000] [0.000] 
Constant 0.903*** -1.03 0.780** -1.005* 
 [0.255] [1.600] [0.196] [0.590] 
Observations 771 771 771 771 
R-squared 0.18   0.26   
Robust standard errors in brackets 
All specifications include ownership and county dummies 






Table 3.11: Robustness to Inclusion of Outliers: Year 2006 
  2006: Textiles&Apparel&Footwear 
 Dep. Var: LohnFirm Dep. Var: PercentageLohnFirm 
 1 2 3 4 
  (OLS) (LOGIT) (OLS) (TOBIT) 
FirmAge -0.007*** -0.104*** -0.007*** -0.019* 
 [0.003] [0.036] [0.003] [0.012] 
FirmHSESRatio2 -0.003 -0.022 -0.004 -0.011** 
 [0.003] [0.022] [0.003] [0.005] 
FirmSpecificity -0.469*** -3.338*** -0.668*** -1.802*** 
 [0.146] [0.870] [0.162] [0.354] 
TotalRevenue -0.012*** -0.119** -0.015*** -0.056*** 
 [0.004] [0.058] [0.005] [0.009] 
NumberEmployees 0.000*** 0.005*** 0.000*** 0.002*** 
 [0.000] [0.002] [0.000] [0.000] 
Constant 0.696*** -0.581 0.620*** -0.057 
 [0.206] [1.417] [0.195] [0.695] 
Observations 658 658 658 658 
R-squared 0.20   0.29   
 
 
Table 3.12: Robustness to Inclusion of Observations Dropped by Logit: Year 2005 
  2005: Textiles&Apparel&Footwear 
 Dep. Var: LohnFirm 
Dep. Var: 
PercentageLohnFirm 
 1 2 3 
  (OLS) (OLS) (TOBIT) 
FirmAge -0.003 -0.005 -0.019 
 [0.003] [0.003] [0.012] 
FirmHSESRatio2 -0.000 -0.001 -0.004 
 [0.001] [0.002] [0.004] 
FirmSpecificity -0.279** -0.539*** -0.991*** 
 [0.138] [0.136] [0.271] 
TotalRevenue -0.017*** -0.020*** -0.074*** 
 [0.004] [0.004] [0.011] 
NumberEmployees 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.002*** 
 [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
Constant -0.783*** 0.582** 1.109 
 [0.250] [0.227] [0.703] 
Observations 743 743 743 
R-squared 0.25 0.33   
Robust standard errors in brackets 
All specifications include ownership and county dummies 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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Table 3.13: Baseline Results Using the Inventory to Output Ratio: Year 2005 
  2005: Textiles&Apparel&Footwear 
 Dep. Var: LohnFirm Dep. Var: PercentageLohnFirm 
 1 2 3 4 
  (OLS) (LOGIT) (OLS) (TOBIT) 
FirmAge -0.004 -0.044 -0.005 -0.019 
 [0.003] [0.042] [0.003] [0.012] 
FirmIORatio2 0.001 -0.004 -0.001 -0.005 
 [0.001] [0.013] [0.002] [0.004] 
FirmSpecificity -0.286** -2.073** -0.534*** -0.976*** 
 [0.138] [0.850] [0.138] [0.271] 
TotalRevenue -0.018*** -0.219*** -0.020*** -0.074*** 
 [0.004] [0.056] [0.004] [0.010] 
NumberEmployees 0.000*** 0.007*** 0.000*** 0.002*** 
 [0.000] [0.002] [0.000] [0.000] 
Constant 0.778*** 1.497 0.585** 1.106 
 [0.249] [3.511] [0.228] [0.702] 
Observations 639 639 639 639 
R-squared 0.25   0.31   
 
Table 3.14: Baseline Results Using the Inventory to Output Ratio: Year 2006 
  2006: Textiles&Apparel&Footwear 
 Dep. Var: LohnFirm Dep. Var: PercentageLohnFirm 
 1 2 3 4 
  (OLS) (LOGIT) (OLS) (TOBIT) 
FirmAge -0.007*** -0.108*** -0.007*** -0.018*** 
 [0.003] [0.037] [0.003] [0.012] 
FirmIORatio2 -0.000 -0.006 -0.003 -0.008** 
 [0.001] [0.008] [0.003] [0.005] 
FirmSpecificity -0.533*** -3.411*** -0.744*** -2.033*** 
 [0.158] [0.942] [0.171] [0.372] 
TotalRevenue -0.011*** -0.123*** -0.015*** -0.056*** 
 [0.004] [0.067] [0.005] [0.009] 
NumberEmployees 0.000*** 0.005*** 0.000*** 0.002*** 
 [0.000] [0.002] [0.000] [0.000] 
Constant 0.735*** -1.517 0.795*** -0.338 
 [0.281] [1.355] [0.285] [0.636] 
Observations 649 649 649 649 
R-squared 0.20   0.30   
Robust standard errors in brackets   
All specifications include ownership and county dummies   




CHAPTER 4  
 
Evidence Using Firm-Product-Level Data 
4.1 Introduction 
In this chapter we use the dataset constructed at the firm-product level to test 
empirically the determinants of the adoption of the lohn system. The predictions of the 
theoretical model from Chapter 2 are now tested under the assumption that the theory 
applies at the firm-product level and that the decision to adopt a production arrangement 
is made independently for each good produced by multi-product firms. In reality, it is 
reasonable to assume that a firm’s ability to find low-cost inputs for the production of a 
given good is affected by the fact that the same firm also produces other goods for which 
the same input might be used. Along the same lines, it can be argued that a firm’s 
bargaining power and the specificity of the relationship for the production of one good 
depend on the other goods the firm produces. However, analyzing the effects of these 
spillovers on the variables of interest is beyond the scope of this work and in the 
following analysis we ignore any product interdependencies.  
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The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 4.2.1 reports the 
summary statistics for the 2005 cross-section and for the two-year panel at the firm-
product level. Section 4.2.2 presents the measures that we use, as well as the empirical 
specification. Section 4.3.1 reports the results of the empirical analysis using cross-
section data at the firm-product level for the year 2005. In general the predictions of the 
theoretical model are confirmed by the analysis of these data. Section 4.3.2 shows that 
our results are robust to the selection of different samples (for different industries, 
different years, etc.) and of a different measure for one of the key variables. The results 
of the analysis using the two-year panel are presented in Section 4.4. Further evidence is 
offered in support of the predictions of the theoretical model about the impact of the 
manufacturer’s bargaining power and of relationship specificity on the use of the lohn 
system. Due to the inclusion of firm dummies in the specification FirmAge does not add 
any new information to the model, so we are not able to show conclusively the impact of 
the ability of the manufacturer to find low cost inputs for the production of a good on the 
use of lohn for that good. Section 4.5 concludes; a few suggestions for possible 
extensions of the empirical analysis are also included here. 
4.2 Summary Statistics, Empirical Variables, and Estimation 
Equation 
4.2.1 Summary Statistics 
Summary statistics for the main variables at the firm-product level are presented 
in Tables 4.1 and 4.2. The cross-section data for the year 2005 is summarized in Table 
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4.1. The sample contains 2964 observations for the apparel, textiles, and footwear 
industries and 313 observations for the food, tobacco, and chemicals industry. The 
statistics are consistent with the ones we observed at the firm-level: the lohn system 
seems to be used in both groups of industries analyzed, but more in the apparel, textiles, 
and footwear group, than in food, tobacco, and chemicals. On average, about 90% of the 
products in textiles, apparel, and footwear were produced using the lohn system in 2005, 
while in the food-processing, tobacco, and chemical industries, on average, lohn was used 
to produce about 37% of the goods. Note that in both industry groups there are products 
that are always produced under lohn (i.e. PercentageLohnProduct=1), but also products 
that are never produced under the lohn system. Also, as we would expect based on the 
theory, products in apparel, textiles, and footwear have product inventory-to-output ratio, 
domestic sales to export sales ratio and product specificity a few times lower than firms 
in the food, tobacco, and chemicals industries. Finally, products in apparel, textiles, and 
footwear have lower, on average, total revenue and fewer employees than do products in 
food, tobacco, and chemicals.  
Table 4.2 presents the summary statistics for the two-year panel for the years 
2005 and 2006. The sample at the firm-product level contains 5135 observations for the 
apparel, textiles, and footwear group and 420 observations for the food, tobacco, and 
chemicals industries. The same observations apply as for the cross-sections. In the 
apparel, textiles, and footwear industries, on average, 92% of the goods are produced 
under this production arrangement, compared to 33% in the industries in the food, 
tobacco, and chemicals industries. Again, the product inventory-to-output ration, the 
product domestic sales to export sales ratio, product specificity, as well as total revenue 
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and the number of employees are lower for products in apparel, textiles, and footwear, 
than for products in the food, tobacco and chemicals industries. 
4.2.2 Empirical Variables and Estimation Equation 
The empirical variables used to measure the variables of interest from the 
theoretical model with firm-product-level data18 are often the product-level counterparts 
of the measures at the firm-level. Specifically, in order to measure the manufacturer’s 
bargaining power we propose two alternative measures: one is based on the ratio of 
domestic to export sales of a product by a given firm (ProductHSESRatio), while the 
other one uses the inventory to output ratio (ProductIORatio). Also, specificity is 
measured by ProductSpecificity, a measure inversely related to the number of firms 
producing a certain product. Finally, for the manufacturer’s ability to find low cost inputs 
we use the number of years a firm has operated (FirmAge). The motivation for choosing 
these measures conceptually is discussed in Section 3.3.2, while details related to the 
construction of the measures are provided in Appendix 3.  
For the analysis of cross-section data at the firm-product level we use the 
following regression equation:  
 ( )0 1 2 3 41ji j j ji ji ji j jiy a X= β + α + δ + β + β ψ + β − θ + β + ε , (4.1) 
where j  is the subscript for firms and i  is the subscript for products. jα  and jβ  are 
ownership and county dummies, and the vector of controls includes the number of 
employees (NumberEmployees) and the firm’s revenue (TotalRevenue). The parameters 
                                                 
18 See Appendix 2 for details about how the firm-product-level dataset was constructed.  
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of interest in this equation are: 1β , the coefficient on the manufacturer’s ability to find 
low cost inputs for the production of good i  ( jia ); 2β , the coefficient on the specificity 
of producing good i  by firm j  ( jiψ ), and 3β , the coefficient on the manufacturer’s 
bargaining power in negotiations for the production of good i  (1 ji− θ ). Based on the 
theory, the expected signs for these coefficients are: 1 2 30; 0; 0β < β < β < . The results 
from estimating this equation using various techniques are presented in Section 4.3. 
For the analysis of the two-year panel the basic regression equation is:  
 ( )* * * * *0 1 2 3 41jit j jit jit jit jt jity a X u= β + γ +β +β ψ +β −θ +β + , (4.2) 
where t  is the time subscript and jγ  is the dummy for firm j . The other variables have 
the interpretations presented above. Section 4.4 presents results obtained from panel-data 
estimation.  
4.3 Cross-Section Results  
4.3.1 Baseline Results 
Table 4.3 displays our baseline results from the estimation of equation (4.1) using 
data at the firm-product level for the year 2005. The sample that was used for these 
estimations includes only the observations for the textiles, apparel and footwear 
industries. The first two columns of the table present results obtained for specifications 
with a binary dependent variable, while in the last two columns the dependent variable is 
defined in a continuous fashion, as detailed in Section 4.2.2. The ability of the 
manufacturer to find low-cost inputs is still measured by FirmAge, a variable that 
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captures the number of years that the company has operated. ProductHSESRatio averages 
the monthly ratio of domestic to export sales of a good by a given firm over a year and is 
used to measure the manufacturer’s bargaining power. Finally, the parameter of 
relationship specificity is measured by ProductSpecificity, which is defined as the inverse 
of the number of firms that produce a certain good in a given year. The construction of all 
the measures is detailed in Appendix 3. In each specification in Table 4.3 we control for 
each company’s annual revenue (TotalRevenue) and number of employees 
(NumberEmployees), and we include ownership and county dummies. Robust standard 
errors are given in brackets.  
Column 1 of Table 4.3 presents the results of ordinary least squares estimation to analyze 
the impact of the right-hand side variables on the probability that the firm uses the lohn 
system for the production of a certain good. The coefficients of interest are all negative, 
as predicted by the theory. Moreover, the coefficients on the product ratio of domestic 
sales to export sales and ProductSpecificity are statistically significant at the 10% level or 
better, while the coefficient on FirmAge is not statistically significant. These observations 
hold true when we estimate the same specification using logit instead of OLS, as 
illustrated in column 2 of Table 4.3. The logit estimates presented in the table are 
marginal effects, not regression coefficients. In order to interpret the results of logit 
estimation we calculated predicted probabilities, which are displayed in Table 4.4(a)-(c).  
Table 4.4.(c) shows that, on average, if a product is produced by only one 
company, the probability that it is produced under the lohn system is about 76%, 
compared to 96% if 20 companies produce that good (keeping all the other regressors at 
their mean values). The product’s ratio of domestic sales to export sales seems to have a 
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smaller impact on the probability of adopting the lohn system in the apparel, textiles, and 
footwear industries.  Table 4.4.(b) shows that, on average the predicted probability of 
adopting the lohn system drops from about 95% to about 85% as the ratio of domestic 
sales to export sales increases. Finally, Table 4.4(a) shows that the number of years a firm 
has operated has almost no impact on the probability that it will use the lohn system for 
the productions of a given good.  
In the specifications for columns 3 and 4 of Table 4.3 the dependent variable is 
continuous (PercentageLohnProduct) and what we estimate is the impact of the 
explanatory variables on the share of sales of a product under the lohn system. We keep 
the rest of the specification the same as for the first two columns in the table. The new 
specification is estimated using ordinary least squares and Tobit, for which we report 
marginal effects. The conclusions from the first two columns also hold for these 
estimations. As predicted by our theoretical model, we obtain that the extent to which 
lohn is used is negatively related to the manufacturer’s ability (as measured by the firm’s 
age) to find low cost inputs ija , to his bargaining power (1− θ , which we measure as the 
producer’s dependence on exports relative to the domestic market), and to the coefficient 
for specificity (ψ ).  Just as before, the coefficients on product specificity and the ratio of 
domestic sales to export sales are statistically significant, both at the 1% level, while the 
coefficient on FirmAge is not statistically significant.  
The four models used for estimation in Table 4.3 are also used to analyze the 
sample for the food, tobacco, and chemicals industry for the year 2005 and the results are 
reported in Table 4.5. The coefficients of the measures for bargaining power and 
relationship specificity are negative across specifications, as we would expect based on 
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the theory. Moreover, the coefficient of the product ratio of domestic sales to export sales 
is statistically significant at the 1% level in all specification. The coefficient of product 
specificity is statistically significant at the 1% level in the logit specification, at the 5% 
level when we use Tobit, and at the 10% level in the OLS estimation with a continuous 
dependent variable. This coefficient is not statistically significant in the estimation using 
the linear probability model.  The same pattern can be observed as in the analysis using 
firm-level data: the degree of relationship specificity seems to have a stronger effect on 
lohn adoption and extent of use in the apparel, textiles, and footwear industries. 
Meanwhile, the way the surplus is divided seems have a stronger effect on that decision 
in the food, tobacco, and chemicals industries.  
The coefficient of firm age is positive across all specifications in Table 4.5, 
seeming to indicate that in the food, tobacco and chemicals industry, older firms are more 
likely to adopt and use the lohn system. This is the same result we got in the analysis of 
firm-level data for these industries and we believe the same explanation holds as to why 
we see this result. 
Based on the analysis above, we conclude that in general our baseline results 
using cross-section data at the firm-product level support our intuition that the predictions 
of the theoretical model presented in Chapter 2 apply to multi-product firms if we ignore 
product interdependence. The measures that we use provide strong evidence that 
relationship specificity and the manufacturer’s bargaining power are inversely related to 
the adoption and extent of usage of the lohn system. While specificity seems to matter 
more in the apparel, textiles, and footwear industries, bargaining power and the division 
of surplus seem to be more important in the group with food, tobacco, and chemicals 
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industries. We get mixed evidence that the manufacturer’s ability to find the low-cost 
input is inversely related to the probability that a firm will adopt for the production of a 
certain good. We believe this result is due to the fact that firm age, which is used to 
measure the manufacturer’s ability to find low-cost inputs, also captures many other firm 
characteristics and we do not have a way to isolate the different effects of these other 
characteristics on the probability that the lohn system will be used. 
4.3.2 Robustness Checks 
In the following we subject our results to robustness tests and show that they still 
hold. We start by checking the sensitivity of our results to sample selection. Table 4.6 
reports the results of the analysis performed on the 2006 cross-section data from the 
textiles, apparel, and footwear industries. The results are remarkably similar to the 
baseline results from Table 4.3. All coefficients of interest have negative sign across 
specifications, as predicted by the theoretical model. The coefficient of product 
specificity is statistically significant at the 1% level in all four specifications, while the 
coefficient of the product ratio of domestic sales to export sales is significant only in the 
logit specification. Once again we observe that, in the apparel, textiles, and footwear 
industries, the degree of relationship specificity has a stronger impact on the use of the 
lohn system than does the division of the surplus. Also, the coefficient on firm age is 
statistically significant at the 1% level across specifications, indicating that younger firms 
are more likely to use the lohn system than older firms.  
We have also tested the sensitivity of the results to a different measure for the 
manufacturer’s bargaining power. The sample used for analysis is the 2005 cross-section 
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at the firm-product level from the apparel, textiles, and footwear industries. The results 
reported in Table 4.7 were obtained by using the ratio of inventory to output 
(ProductIORatio) instead of the ratio of domestic to export sales (ProductHSESRatio) to 
measure the producer’s bargaining power. Note that the results obtained here are in 
excellent agreement with our baseline results from Table 4.3. All the coefficients of 
interest have the correct sign in all the specifications, showing that lohn is more likely to 
be used when the manufacturer’s ability to find low cost inputs is low, when his 
bargaining power is low, and when the coefficient for relationship specificity is low. The 
estimates are statistically significant at the 1% for product specificity, at the 10% or 
better for the measure of bargaining power, and not statistically significant for firm age.  
The robustness checks discussed above offer additional evidence in support of the 
baseline results presented in the previous section. Based on the results reported in both 
sections we conclude that the predictions of the theoretical model are in general validated 
by the analysis of cross-section data at the product-firm level. Next, we present some 
results obtained for the analysis of panel data. 
4.4 Panel Data Results 
The panel that we use is a two-year panel for the years 2005 and 2006. Table 4.8 
reports the results obtained for the sample from the apparel, textiles, and footwear 
industries using the same models and measures as for the baseline results in Table 4.3. 
Hence, the ability to find low-cost inputs is measured by FirmAge; the manufacturer’s 
bargaining power is measured by the ProductHSESRatio, while ProductSpecificity 
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measures the degree of relationship specificity19. The vector of controls includes firms’ 
annual revenue (TotalRevenue) and number of employees (NumberEmployees), as well as 
county and ownership fixed effects. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are 
included in brackets.  
The results are in excellent agreement with the baseline results we used with 
cross-section data. All coefficients of interest are negative across specifications, as 
predicted based on the theoretical model. The coefficients of ProductHSESRatio and 
ProductSpecificityi are statistically significant at the 5% level or better in all 
specifications, while the coefficient on FirmAge is not statistically significant. We get the 
same results when we use the two-year panel sample from the food, tobacco, and 
chemicals industries, as illustrated in Table 4.9. 
We also report some results obtained when firm dummies are included in the 
specification. Note that in these cases we drop ownership and county dummies from the 
estimation equations, since they become redundant in the presence of firm dummies. 
Controlling for individual firm characteristics is desirable: models that include firm 
dummies in the vector of controls explain much more of the variation in the data than 
similar specifications that control for the type of ownership and location, but not for 
individual firm characteristics. For instance, the R square for OLS estimation is over 0.74 
or better for specifications that include firm dummies, as opposed to less than 0.2 for 
regressions that include ownership and county dummies instead.  
Table 4.10 reports the results of the analysis with firm dummies in, for the sample 
from apparel, textiles, and footwear industries.  Columns 1 and 2 present results of OLS 
                                                 
19 The construction of all the measures is detailed in Section 3.3.2 and in Appendix 3.  
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estimation: in the first column the dependent variable is binary, while in the second 
column it is continuous. For both specifications the estimates for ProductHSESRatio and 
ProductSpecificity have the negative sign that we expect from our theory, but the 
coefficients are not statistically significant. This is because the inclusion of firm dummies 
eliminates most of the variation in the variables. The coefficient of FirmAge is positive 
and statistically significant at the 1% level. In columns 3 and 4 of Table 4.10 FirmAge is 
dropped from the specifications, otherwise, the models are the same. The estimates for 
the other coefficients do not change almost at all, and the new R-squares are identical to 
the ones for the specifications in which FirmAge was included. We conclude that 
FirmAge is redundant in the model with firm dummies and cannot be used to measure the 
manufacturer’s ability to find low-cost inputs; hence, we are not able to test this 
prediction of the theoretical model. However, as discussed above, we are still able to 
bring some evidence in support of the other two testable predictions of the model.  
Note also that our baseline results include OLS estimates, but no results for logit 
or Tobit estimation. In the case of the logit the reason is that, in the presence of firm 
dummies, the model drops most of the observations due to perfect prediction (see 
Footnote 14 for an explanation of this issue) and runs the regression on a very restricted 
sample (511 observations as compared to the 5,135 that are used for OLS estimation). In 
the case of Tobit, the model fails to achieve convergence due to severe censoring at 1.  
We also present the results of the analysis with firm dummies in using a different 
measure for one of the key variables. Table 4.11 presents the results obtained when an 
alternative measure is used for the manufacturer’s bargaining power (ProductIORatio) 
and the conclusions of that analysis are exactly the same. The coefficients on 
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ProductHSESRatio and ProductSpecificity are negative, but statistically insignificant 
across specifications, while the coefficient on FirmAge, when included in the 
specification, has a positive sign. When FirmAge is dropped, in columns 3 and 4 of Table 
4.11, we again see that FirmAge does not add new information to the model in the 
presence of firm dummies. 
We conclude that panel data brings further evidence in support of the predictions 
of the theoretical model that lohn is more likely to be used when the manufacturer’s 
bargaining power is low and when relationship specificity is low. However, due to the 
limitations of the data available, the analysis of panel-data cannot provide conclusive 
evidence in support of the prediction that the use of lohn is inversely related to the 
manufacturer’s ability to find low cost inputs.  
4.5 Conclusions 
This chapter brings new insights to understanding the decision to adopt the lohn 
system, by using a firm-product-level dataset to study this decision under the assumption 
that all firms behave like multi-products firms and ignoring potential product-
interdependencies. First we develop an empirical approach similar to the one in Chapter 3 
to test the predictions of the theoretical model using cross-section data at the firm-product 
level for the years 2005 and 2006 and we find that those predictions hold under the 
assumptions of this chapter. For example, firms are more likely to use lohn for the 
production of goods when the manufacturer’s bargaining power (measured as the ratio of 
domestic to export sales or as the ratio of inventory to output) is low, or when the degree 
of relationship specificity, measured as a product specificity index, is low. We are not 
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able to obtain conclusive evidence about the prediction that manufacturers with low 
ability to find low-cost inputs are more likely to use the lohn system. This is because firm 
age, the measure that we use for this theoretical variable, also captures other firm 
characteristics that we do not control for in this model. 
In this chapter we also test the implications of our theory on a two-year panel for 
2005 and 2006, in addition to the annual cross-sections for the two years. The results 
provide additional support for the predictions of the theory about the impact of the 
manufacturer’s bargaining power and of relationship specificity on the use of lohn. 
Again, we do not have conclusive evidence about the relationship between the 
manufacturer’s ability to find low-cost inputs and the adoption of the lohn system. We 
also conduct a series of robustness tests and find that our results are not sensitive, for 
instance, to sample selection or to the choice of measure for one of the key variables. 
Apart from testing the predictions of the model developed in Chapter 2, the data 
can be exploited further to answer other interesting questions, such as what is the impact 
of the lohn system on a firm’s productivity and output. An answer to this question might 
shed light on whether firms in a given industry should adopt the lohn system and whether 
this production arrangement could be a viable long-term option or just a short-term 
strategy. 
We also plan to extend the empirical analysis conducted in this dissertation. 
Currently our analysis uses firm and product level datasets from six industries in 
Romania to test the implications of the theoretical model. However, the broader question 
of why the lohn system is adopted can be tested at the country or industry level by 
exploiting the variation in the usage of the lohn system across countries/industries. For 
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instance, it would be possible to gain some insight into how different institutions may 
affect outcomes at this micro level by comparing adoption of the lohn system by firms in 
the same industry but in two countries that differ in the institutions affecting the industry 
in specific ways, and/or that experienced changes in these institutions that could be 
regarded as exogenous. 
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Tables 
Table 4.1: Summary Statistics for Annual Cross-Sections: Year 2005 
Variable Obs Mean Std.Dev. Min Max 
Textiles&Apparel&Footwear           
LohnProduct 2964 0.90 0.30 0.00 1.00 
PercentageLohnProduct 2964 0.87 0.31 0.00 1.00 
FirmAge 2964 10.17 4.12 0.00 14.00 
ProductIORatio 2964 5.5 51.99 0.00 1614.30 
ProductHSESRatio 2964 6.54 53.26 0.00 1624.98 
ProductSpecificity 2964 0.05 0.12 0.00 1.00 
TotalRevenue 2964 5.93 10.11 0.01 150.30 
NumberEmployees 2964 282.30 397.13 5.00 2097.00 
Food&Tobbaco&Chemicals           
LohnProduct 313 0.37 0.49 0.00 1.00 
PercentageLohnProduct 313 0.34 0.47 0.00 1.00 
FirmAge 313 11.49 4.16 0.00 14.00 
ProductIORatio 313 8.65 60.10 0.00 938.40 
ProductHSESRatio 313 22.37 91.72 0.00 1232.44 
ProductSpecificity 313 0.20 0.27 0.00 1.00 
TotalRevenue 313 83.98 254.14 0.07 1442.07 
NumberEmployees 313 469.40 953.53 5.00 5275.00 
 
Table 4.2: Summary Statistics for Two-Year Panel Data 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Min Max 
Textiles&Apparel&Footwear           
LohnProduct 5135 0.92 0.27 0.00 1 
PercentageLohnProduct 5135 0.89 0.29 0.00 1.00 
FirmAge 5135 10.11 4.90 0.00 15 
ProductIORatio 5135 9.60 73.64 0.00 1682.105
ProductHSESRatio 5135 9.74 79.98 0.00 3295.64 
ProductSpecificity 5135 0.05 0.12 0.00 1.00 
TotalRevenue 5135 6.60 9.76 0.01 94.69 
NumberEmployees 5135 304.43 386.95 5.00 2097.00 
Food&Tobbaco&Chemicals           
LohnProduct 420 0.33 0.47 0.00 1 
PercentageLohnProduct 420 0.31 0.46 0.00 1.00 
FirmAge 420 12.79 3.67 0.00 15 
ProductIORatio 420 2.42 10.48 0.00 144.5334
ProductHSESRatio 420 27.39 114.93 0.00 1481.72 
ProductSpecificity 420 0.24 0.29 0.00 1.00 
TotalRevenue 420 129.06 335.68 0.12 1731.81 
NumberEmployees 420 628.86 1097.23 5.00 5275.00 
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Table 4.3: Baseline Results at the Firm-Product Level: Textile&Apparel&Footwear, 
Cross-Section, Year 2005 
  2005: Textiles&Apparel&Footwear 
 Dep. Var: LohnFirm Dep. Var: PercentageLohnFirm
 1 2 3 4 
  (OLS) (LOGIT) (OLS) (TOBIT) 
FirmAge -0.002 -0.025 -0.002 -0.011 
 [0.002] [0.024] [0.002] [0.013] 
ProductHSESRatio -0.025* -0.323*** -0.034*** -0.182*** 
 [0.015] [0.118] [0.012] [0.048] 
ProductSpecificity -0.280*** -1.922*** -0.405*** -1.439*** 
 [0.074] [0.426] [0.050] [0.209] 
TotalRevenue -0.018*** -0.170*** -0.017*** -0.059*** 
 [0.002] [0.020] [0.002] [0.005] 
NumberEmployees 0.004*** 0.069*** 0.006*** 0.017*** 
 [0.000] [0.006] [0.000] [0.001] 
Constant 0.064 -1.773* 0.045 -1.663*** 
 [0.158] [0.911] [0.137] [0.625] 
Observations 2643 2643 2643 2643 
R-squared 0.27   0.29   
Robust standard errors in brackets 
All specifications include ownership and county dummies 
* significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, ***significant at 1% 
 
Table 4.4: Predicted Probabilities 
Table 4.4(a)     Table 4.4(b) 









































Table 4.5: Baseline Results at the Firm-Product Level: Food&Tobacco&Chemicals, 
Cross-Section, Year 2005 
  2005: Food&Tobacco&Chemicals 
 Dep. Var: LohnFirm Dep. Var: PercentageLohnFirm
 1 2 3 4 
  (OLS) (LOGIT) (OLS) (TOBIT) 
FirmAge 0.007 0.109** 0.009 0.159 
 [0.008] [0.047] [0.007] [0.072] 
ProductHSESRatio -0.170*** -34.949*** -0.156*** -41.666*** 
 [0.050] [11.036] [0.046] [11.592] 
ProductSpecificity -0.114 -2.126** -0.178* -3.091** 
 [0.101] [1.008] [0.091] [1.513] 
TotalRevenue -0.007* -0.019*** 0.000 -0.024*** 
 [0.004] [0.006] [0.000] [0.009] 
NumberEmployees 0.010* 0.013* -0.002** 0.01 
 [0.006] [0.008] [0.001] [0.011] 
Constant -1.498** 1.445 0.588** -0.561 
 [0.729] [1.911] [0.322] [2.420] 
Observations 246 246 246 246 
R-squared 0.35   0.4   
Robust standard errors in brackets 
All specifications include ownership and county dummies. 






Table 4.6: Robustness to Sample Selection: Cross-Section, Year 2006 
  2006: Textiles&Apparel&Footwear 
 Dep. Var: LohnFirm Dep. Var: PercentageLohnFirm 
 1 2 3 4 
  (OLS) (LOGIT) (OLS) (TOBIT) 
FirmAge -0.004*** -0.070*** -0.004*** -0.027*** 
 [0.001] [0.021] [0.001] [0.012] 
ProductHSESRatio -0.019 -0.266*** -0.020 -0.125 
 [0.014] [0.112] [0.017] [0.130] 
ProductSpecificity -0.425*** -3.313*** -0.442*** -2.256*** 
 [0.080] [0.563] [0.083] [0.343] 
TotalRevenue -0.009*** -0.079*** -0.010*** -0.059*** 
 [0.002] [0.018] [0.002] [0.007] 
NumberEmployees 0.002*** 0.032*** 0.003*** 0.024*** 
 [0.000] [0.006] [0.000] [0.003] 
Constant 0.649** 1.505 0.527* 0.423 
 [0.330] [1.848] [0.299] [1.282] 
Observations 2416 2416 2416 2416 
R-squared 0.19   0.21   
 
Table 4.7: Robustness to Change in Measure: Cross-Section, Year 2005 
  2005: Textiles&Apparel&Footwear 
 Dep. Var: LohnFirm Dep. Var: PercentageLohnFirm 
 1 2 3 4 
  (OLS) (LOGIT) (OLS) (TOBIT) 
FirmAge -0.002 -0.025 -0.002 -0.011 
 [0.002] [0.024] [0.002] [0.012] 
ProductIORatio -0.030* -0.297*** -0.042** -0.229** 
 [0.015] [0.081] [0.017] [0.066] 
ProductSpecificity -0.279*** -1.956*** -0.338*** -1.438*** 
 [0.074] [0.477] [0.072] [0.287] 
TotalRevenue -0.018*** -0.208*** -0.019*** -0.122*** 
 [0.002] [0.028] [0.002] [0.010] 
NumberEmployees 0.004*** 0.057*** 0.004*** 0.028*** 
 [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.003] 
Constant 0.064 2.705 -0.12 2.727*** 
 [0.158] [2.100] [0.154] [0.840] 
Observations 2643 2643 2643 2643 
R-squared 0.27   0.30   
Robust standard errors in brackets 
All specifications include ownership and county dummies. 
* significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, ***significant at 1% 
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Table 4.8 Panel Data, No Firm Dummies: Textiles&Apparel&Footwear 
  2005-2006: Textiles&Apparel&Footwear 
 LohnProduct PercentageLohn LohnProduct PercentageLohn 
 1 2 3 4 
  (OLS) (LOGIT) (OLS) (TOBIT) 
FirmAge -0.001 -0.001   
 [0.001] [0.001]   
ProductHSESRatio -0.009** -0.011** -0.010** -0.011** 
 [0.005] [0.005] [0.005] [0.005] 
ProductSpecificity -0.362*** -0.393*** -0.363*** -0.395*** 
 [0.055] [0.055] [0.055] [0.055] 
TotalRevenue -0.016*** -0.018*** -0.016*** -0.018*** 
 [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] 
NumberEmployees 0.003*** 0.004*** 0.003*** 0.004*** 
 [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
Constant 0.949*** 0.922*** 0.944*** 0.915*** 
 [0.008] [0.009] [0.005] [0.005] 
Observations 5135 5135 5135 5135 
R-squared 0.17  0.17  
 
Table 4.9: Panel Data, No Firm Dummies: Food&Tobacco&Chemicals 
  2005-2006: Food&Tobacco&Chemicals 
 LohnProduct PercentageLohn LohnProduct PercentageLohn 
 1 2 3 4 
  (OLS) (LOGIT) (OLS) (TOBIT) 
FirmAge -0.004 -0.001   
 [0.007] [0.007]   
ProductHSESRatio -0.073*** -0.066*** -0.074*** -0.067*** 
 [0.022] [0.020] [0.022] [0.020] 
ProductSpecificity -0.334*** -0.331*** -0.334*** -0.331*** 
 [0.069] [0.065] [0.069] [0.065] 
TotalRevenue 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] 
NumberEmployees 0.000 -0.001*** 0.000 -0.001*** 
 [0.001] [0.000] [0.001] [0.000] 
Constant 0.507*** 0.461*** 0.465*** 0.450*** 
 [0.087] [0.087] [0.034] [0.032] 
Observations 420 420 420 420 
R-squared 0.11  0.11  
Robust standard errors in brackets    
All specifications include ownership and county dummies 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%   
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Table 4.10: Results for Panel Data, Firm Dummies in: Textiles&Apparel&Footwear 
  2005-2006: Textiles&Apparel&Footwear 
 LohnProduct PercentageLohn LohnProduct PercentageLohn 
 1 2 3 4 
  (OLS) (OLS) (OLS) (OLS) 
FirmAge 0.015*** 0.017***   
 [0.005] [0.006]   
ProductHSESRatio -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 
 [0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.003] 
ProductSpecificity -0.046 -0.016 -0.049 -0.011 
 [0.045] [0.042] [0.045] [0.042] 
TotalRevenue -0.001 -0.006*** -0.002 -0.005 
 [0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.003] 
NumberEmployees 0.001*** 0.002*** 0.001 0.001** 
 [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
Constant 0.745*** 0.571*** 0.991*** 0.990*** 
 [0.080] [0.081] [0.006] [0.005] 
Observations 5135 5135 5135 5135 
R-squared 0.74 0.77 0.74 0.77 
 
Table 4.11: Robustness to Change in Measure: Panel Data 2005-2006 
  2005-2006: Textiles&Apparel&Footwear 
 LohnProduct PercentageLohn LohnProduct PercentageLohn 
 1 2 3 4 
  (OLS) (OLS) (OLS) (OLS) 
FirmAge 0.015*** 0.027***   
 [0.005] [0.005]   
ProductIORatio -0.005 -0.004 -0.005 -0.005 
 [0.005] [0.004] [0.005] [0.004] 
ProductSpecificity -0.046 0.016 -0.049 0.011 
 [0.045] [0.042] [0.045] [0.042] 
TotalRevenue 0.001 -0.006** 0.002 -0.005 
 [0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.003] 
NumberEmployees 0.001** 0.002*** 0.001 0.001** 
 [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
Constant 0.756*** 0.573*** 0.991*** 0.991*** 
 [0.080] [0.081] [0.006] [0.005] 
Observations 5135 5135 5135 5135 
R-squared 0.74 0.77 0.74 0.77 
Robust standard errors in brackets    
All specifications include firm dummies    
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%   
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APPENDICES 
Appendix 1. The Short-term Indicators Survey: Background and 
Sample Design 
The Short-term Indicators Survey (or the IND TS survey) is a monthly industry 
survey that the National Institute of Statistics in Romania (henceforth referred to as NIS) 
has conducted without interruption since January 2000. Initially, the data collected 
through this survey included information on physical production and turnover for a 
representative sample of firms from all industries in Romania. Since January 2005 the 
survey has been expanded to include information on several other dimensions: the value 
of firm contracts signed with domestic and foreign partners, the number of employees, 
wages, and investments.  
In the following we describe the sample design for the IND TS survey: 
1. For a given year, the pool from which the sample is drawn is made up of all 
firms, in all industries, which were active two years before. A firm is considered to be 
active in a given year if the average number of employees or annual turnover is different 
from zero. 
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2. Firms from the original pool that have four or fewer employees are dropped, 
provided that firms left in the pool account for at least 90% of turnover and at least 90% 
of the number of employees in each industry. For industries in which this criterion is not 
met, only firms with two or fewer employees are dropped. For the year 2007, after 
dropping firms from the original pool in this fashion, the firms that were left accounted 
for 94.47% of turnover and 94.01% of all employees from the original pool.  
3. Stratified random sampling with a Neyman allocation is used instead of simple 
random sampling in this sample design.20 The principle underlying the Neyman 
allocation method is that it produces the minimum sample size which will provide an 
estimate with a fixed sampling variance of turnover.21 The characteristics used to stratify 
firms are the NACE code and the employment size class.  
4. For the largest employment size class (in our case, 50 or more employees), this 
allocation procedure places all the firms in those strata in the sample. In other words, all 
firms with 50 or more workers for all industries are included in the national sample. 
5. As employment decreases, smaller proportions of firms are included in the 
sample according to the Neyman allocation method, so as to obtain the minimum sample 
size that will provide an estimate of turnover with a fixed sampling variance. From any 
given stratum firms are drawn randomly, with all firms belonging to the same stratum 
having the same probability of being included in the sample.  
6. The size of the national sample is determined such that, with probability .95, 
average turnover for firms in the sample differs by at most 3% from average turnover for 
                                                 
20 Information on stratified sampling obtained from the BLS Handbook of Methods available at 
http://www.bls.gov/opub/hom/homch9_g.htm 
21 Please refer to http://www.amstat.org/Sections/Srms/Proceedings/papers/1996_033.pdf for more 
information on the Neyman allocation method. 
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all firms in all strata. This feature of the sample design also ensures that the sample is 
representative of the underlying population. 
Appendix 2. Construction of the Two Datasets 
Recall that the data from the IND TS survey are monthly data at the product level 
for a number of firms and that most of the data are in physical units. Specifically: 
inventory at the beginning of the month, quantity produced in the current month, 
inventory at the end of the month, quantity sold domestically and abroad in the current 
month, and quantity produced under the lohn system in the current month are all in 
physical units and not in value terms. The only data available in monetary terms is total 
sales in the month of reporting, which is the sum of sales abroad, sales domestically, and 
sales of products produced under the lohn system. Total sales in the month of reporting 
are given in the Romanian currency Leu (RON). 
We use these data to construct yearly firm-product level and firm-level datasets, 
which we can merge with the annual data available from firms’ balance sheets. First we 
convert to monetary values all the information that is available in physical units: 
inventory at the beginning of the month, quantity produced in the current month, quantity 
sold in the current month (domestically, abroad and under the lohn system), and 
inventory at the end of the month. This is achieved by using the average price per unit 
sold of each product, which we calculate as follows:  
.
. .
total salesAverage price per unit qty sold
qty sold to qty sold
of goods produced






The above formula for calculating average price per unit of a product implicitly 
assumes that the price per unit is the same for units sold domestically, for units sold 
abroad, as well as for units sold that were produced under the lohn system, which seems 
like a reasonable assumption in this case.  
Next, we multiply the average price per unit calculated as above by the amount in 
physical units to get monthly figures at the firm-product level. We then add up the 
monthly figures to get annual figures at the firm-product level, then sum over all products 
for each firm to obtain annual data at the firm level. The results of these manipulations 
are an annual firm-product level dataset and an annual firm-level dataset in which the 
production variables are expressed in monetary units.  
 
Appendix 3. Measuring Variables of Interest from the Theoretical 
Model 
A.3.1. The Dependent Variable 
a. For the annual firm-product level dataset we construct the following alternative 
measures of the dependent variable: 
 LohnProduct: binary variable that takes on the value one if the value of quantity 
sold of a good produced under lohn in a given year is greater than zero, and zero 
otherwise. 
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 Percentage_LohnProduct: the share of sales under lohn system at the firm-
product level, calculated as the sales of a product under the lohn system divided by total 
export sales of a product in a given year.  
b. For the annual firm-level dataset we construct the following measures of the dependent 
variable: 
 LohnFirm: the counterpart of LohnProduct in the firm-level dataset, focusing on 
whether a firm has positive sales of output produced under the lohn system for any of its 
products in a given year. If it does, then the LohnFirm variable takes the value one, 
otherwise, it takes the value zero.  
 Percentage_LohnFirm: the correspondent of Percentage_LohnProduct in the 
firm-level dataset, calculated as the sales of a product under the lohn system summed 
over all the products the firm produces, divided by the total export sales of all products in 
a given year. 
A.3.2. Bargaining Power of the Manufacturer 
a. For the annual firm-product level dataset: 
 ProductHSESRatio: for each firm-product entry in a given month we measure the 
numerator as sales to the domestic market that month and the denominator as export sales 
that month. We then convert this ratio to annual figures by calculating its value for all 
months in a year, summing up the twelve values and dividing by twelve. 
 ProductIORatio: for each firm-product entry in a given month we measure the 
numerator as inventory at the beginning of the current month and the denominator as 
 85
output in the previous month. We then convert this ratio to annual figures by calculating 
its value for all months in a year, summing up the twelve values and dividing by twelve; 
b. For the annual firm-level dataset we construct two alternative measures that are the 
equivalent of the variables described above: 
 FirmHSESRatio, which we calculate in two different ways. The first one is to take 
a simple average of the ProductHSESRatio’s described above for all the products the firm 
produces. The second way to measure this ratio is to construct a weighted average of the 
ProductHSESRatio’s over all the products manufactured by a given firm and use the 
shares of sales of the products as weights. We construct this measure as follows: 1. we 
multiply the annual ProductHSESRatio for a given product by the share of that product in 
the firm’s total annual sales and 2. we sum over all the products produced by the firm. 
Note that the weighted average takes into account the share of each product in the total 
output of the firm, hence giving a higher weight to the products with the higher share. 
Meanwhile, the simple average gives all products the same weight. Hence, we prefer 
FirmHSESRatio2 and we use the other measure only for consistency checks. 
 FirmIORatio: we use the same two different ways to calculate this ratio as in the 
case of the FirmHSESRatio. FirmIORatio1 is calculated by taking a simple average of the 
ProductIORatio’s described above, for all the products produced by a given firm. In 
order to construct FirmIORatio2 we calculate a weighted average of the 
ProductIORatio’s over all the products manufactured by a given firm and use the shares 
of sales of the products as weights. This involves two steps: 1. multiplying the annual 
ProductIORatio for a given product by the share of that product in the firm’s total annual 
sales and 2. summing over all the products of the firm. The same considerations apply as 
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to why the measure based on weighted average should be preferred to the one based on 
simple averaging.  
A.3.3. Ability of the Manufacturer to Find Low-Cost Inputs 
a. For the annual firm-product level dataset: 
 TotalSales_Annual: Value of output or sales of a product in a given year. It is 
measured in monetary units (Romanian Leu--RON) 
b. For the annual firm-level dataset: 
 AnnualRevenue: the annual variable that we got from the firms’ balance sheets. It 
is measured in monetary units (Romanian Leu--RON) 
 NumberEmployees: average number of employees as reported in the firm’s 
balance sheet for the current year.  
 FirmAge: equal to the year of reporting minus the year the firm was established, 
as reported in the firm’s balance sheet.  
A.3.4. Parameter for Specificity 
a. For the firm-product level dataset we construct the variable ProductSpecificity as 
the inverse of the number of firms which produce a certain product in that year.  
b. For the firm-level dataset we construct the variable FirmSpecificity as follows: 
We use a weighted average of the ProductSpecificity for all the products produced by any 
given firm using the share of output in the total firm output as weights. 
In order to calculate this measure, we first take the ratio of the output of a given 
product for any given firm in a year to total output of that firm in that year. Then we 
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multiply that ratio by the inverse of the number of firms in the sample which produce that 
product in that year. Finally, we sum up the figures obtained in this fashion over all the 

























represents the inverse of the number of firms that produce good k  in year t .22 
                                                 
22 A similar measure for specificity is used in Gonzalez-Diaz, Manuel, Benito Arrunada  and Alberto 
Fernandez (2000), “Causes of subcontracting: evidence from panel data on construction firms” Journal of 
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